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Healthcare Licensing and Liability
BENJAMIN J. MCMICHAEL*
The United States’ affordable care crisis and chronic physician shortage have
required advanced practice registered nurses (APRNs) and physician assistants
(PAs) to assume increasingly important roles in the healthcare system. The increased
use of these nonphysician providers has improved access to healthcare and lowered
the price of care. However, restrictive occupational licensing laws—specifically,
scope-of-practice laws—have limited their ability to care for patients. While these
laws, by themselves, have important implications for the healthcare system, they also
interact with other legal regimes to impact the provision of care. Restrictive scopeof-practice laws can increase the malpractice liability risk of physicians and
decrease this risk for APRNs and PAs via several traditional tort doctrines, such as
respondeat superior. In this Article, I provide the first empirical analysis of the
interplay between malpractice liability and scope-of-practice laws in the provision
of healthcare.
I concentrate on obstetric care and analyze a dataset of nearly 70 million births
over an eighteen-year period. The results demonstrate that relaxing APRN and PA
scope-of-practice laws significantly reduces the caesarean section rate—which is
currently over three times the rate recommended by the World Health
Organization—when malpractice liability risk is low. When malpractice liability risk
is high, however, relaxing these laws results in no change in the caesarean section
rate. I find similar results for other outcomes, such as medical inductions of labor.
The results thus elucidate an important interaction between scope-of-practice laws
and malpractice liability.
Based on this evidence, which shows that relaxing scope-of-practice laws can
significantly reduce the number of women who unnecessarily undergo major
surgery, I argue that states should eliminate restrictive scope-of-practice laws for
APRNs and PAs. Doing so will remove unnecessary limits on capable healthcare
professionals, better allow malpractice liability to deter the delivery of unsafe care,
and improve patient health outcomes.

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law. For helpful
comments on earlier drafts of this Article, I thank the participants of the Midwestern Law and
Economics 2018 Annual Conference and the Southern Economic Association 2018 Annual
Meeting.
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INTRODUCTION
As access to healthcare continues to dominate national and local healthcare policy
debates, much of the discussion has centered on the ways in which individuals pay
for health insurance. Medicaid expansion, the Affordable Care Act’s health
insurance exchanges, and value-based healthcare have received a disproportionate
amount of attention recently. While these debates are important, access to healthcare
fundamentally depends on a healthcare workforce that is willing and able to supply
the healthcare demanded by individuals across the country. Indeed, without an
adequate healthcare workforce, the quality of an individual’s insurance coverage
becomes relatively meaningless. And recent evidence suggests that many parts of the
United States lack adequate access to healthcare providers. For example, research
suggests that demand for physicians could outstrip supply, resulting in a shortage of
as many as 90,000 physicians by 2025.1 Rural areas could be particularly affected,
with recent estimates suggesting that the number of physicians practicing in these
areas could decrease 23% by 2030.2
In the face of the ongoing shortfall of physicians, advanced practice registered
nurses (APRNs) and physician assistants (PAs) are increasingly serving as frontline

1. IHS MARKIT LTD., THE COMPLEXITIES OF PHYSICIAN SUPPLY AND DEMAND:
PROJECTIONS FROM 2017 TO 2032, at 12 (2019), https://www.aamc.org/system/files/c/2/312019_update_-_the_complexities_of_physician_supply_and_demand_-_projections_from_2
017-2032.pdf [https://perma.cc/PN5G-QZPZ].
2. Lucy Skinner, Douglas O. Staiger, David I. Auerbach & Peter Buerhaus, Implications
of an Aging Rural Physician Workforce, 381 NEW ENG. J. MED. 299, 300 (2019).
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healthcare providers and playing more important roles in the healthcare system.3
Indeed, APRNs and PAs are the principal source of primary care in many geographic
areas, and these providers are more likely than physicians to practice in rural and
underserved areas.4 However, while APRNs and PAs continue to assume more
responsibility throughout the country, their legal authority to care for patients varies
widely from state to state.5 Specifically, state scope-of-practice (SOP) laws, which
are a subset of the more general occupational licensing laws, determine what services
members of a given profession may provide and the conditions under which they
may provide those services.6
States generally justify SOP laws as necessary to ensure patient safety by
preventing unqualified individuals from providing care.7 While these laws can serve
this purpose, overly restrictive SOP laws can have the opposite effect by inhibiting
the ability of qualified APRNs and PAs to care for patients. Clinical research has
shown that, within their training and education, APRNs and PAs can provide care
that equals or exceeds that provided by physicians,8 and recent economic analyses
have demonstrated that restrictive SOP laws can function as anticompetitive
restraints that protect physicians in markets for healthcare services at the expense of
patients.9 Studies within this latter strand of research have found evidence of harm
typical of anticompetitive restrictions, including higher prices, reduced access to

3. Grant R. Martsolf, Hilary Barnes, Michael R. Richards, Kristin N. Ray, Heather M.
Brom & Matthew D. McHugh, Employment of Advanced Practice Clinicians in Physician
Practices, 178 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 988, 988–89 (2018).
4. David I. Auerbach, Will the NP Workforce Grow in the Future? New Forecasts and
Implications for Healthcare Delivery, 50 MED. CARE 606, 607–08 (2012); Thomas
Kippenbrock, Wen-Juo Lo, Ellen Odell & Bill Buron, The Southern States: NPs Made an
Impact in Rural and Healthcare Shortage Areas, 27 J. AM. ASS’N NURSE PRAC. 707, 710–13
(2015); Benjamin J. McMichael, Beyond Physicians: The Effect of Licensing and Liability
Laws on the Supply of Nurse Practitioners and Physician Assistants, 15 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 732, 759–64 (2018); Ying Xue, James S. Goodwin, Deepak Adhikari, Mukaila A. Raji
& Yong-Fang Kuo, Trends in Primary Care Provision to Medicare Beneficiaries by
Physicians, Nurse Practitioners, or Physician Assistants: 2008–2014, 8 J. PRIMARY CARE &
COMMUNITY HEALTH 256, 260 (2017).
5. See McMichael, supra note 4, at 734–37 (discussing the state variation in the legal
authority of APRNs and PAs).
6. See Barbara J. Safriet, Closing the Gap Between Can and May in Health-Care
Providers’ Scopes of Practice: A Primer for Policymakers, 19 YALE J. REG. 301, 317–23
(2002) (discussing SOP laws generally); see also McMichael, supra note 4, at 734–37
(discussing the SOP laws governing nurse practitioners and PAs).
7. Morris M. Kleiner, Enhancing Quality or Restricting Competition: The Case of
Licensing Public School Teachers, 5 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 3, 8 (2010) (“The
general rationale for licensing is the health and safety of consumers. Beyond that, the quality
of service delivery . . . [is] sometimes invoked.”).
8. See DANIEL J. GILMAN & TARA ISA KOSLOV, FTC, POLICY PERSPECTIVES:
COMPETITION AND THE REGULATION OF ADVANCED PRACTICE NURSES 27–35 (2014)
(reviewing the existing evidence).
9. See, e.g., E. KATHLEEN ADAMS & SARA MARKOWITZ, HAMILTON PROJECT, IMPROVING
EFFICIENCY IN THE HEALTH-CARE SYSTEM: REMOVING ANTICOMPETITIVE BARRIERS FOR
ADVANCED PRACTICE REGISTERED NURSES AND PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS 5–11 (2018)
(discussing the anticompetitive nature of many SOP laws).
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healthcare services, and changes in how care is provided.10 Based on this evidence,
multiple national organizations, including the National Academy of Medicine, have
called on states to relax their SOP laws.11 Both the Obama and Trump
Administrations have issued similar recommendations.12 A minority of states have
heeded these calls, but the ongoing debate and political battle over SOP laws has
only intensified over the last decade.13 Physician organizations, in particular,
vigorously oppose the relaxation of these laws—often on grounds of promoting
patient safety.14
As important as the debate over SOP laws is, it has so far excluded a meaningful
discussion of a parallel legal mechanism which can both accomplish the same goals
as SOP laws (i.e., promote patient safety) and modulate the effect these laws have
on healthcare providers. Specifically, APRNs and PAs may be sued for malpractice
just as physicians and other professionals may be.15 And a large body of evidence

10. See Morris M. Kleiner, Allison Marier, Kyoung Won Park & Coady Wing, Relaxing
Occupational Licensing Requirements: Analyzing Wages and Prices for a Medical Service,
59 J.L. & ECON. 261, 274–77 (2016) (showing that restrictive SOP laws raise prices); Sara
Markowitz, E. Kathleen Adams, Mary Jane Lewitt & Anne L. Dunlop, Competitive Effects of
Scope of Practice Restrictions: Public Health or Public Harm?, 55 J. HEALTH ECON. 201,
209–16 (2017) (demonstrating that restrictive SOP laws induce changes in how care is
delivered); McMichael, supra note 4, at 759–64 (finding that restrictive SOP laws inhibit
access to healthcare).
11. These organizations include, among others, the National Academy of Medicine
(formerly the Institute of Medicine), the National Governors Association, and the American
Association of Retired People. AMANDA DUNKER, ESTHER KROFAH & FREDERICK ISASI,
NATIONAL GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION, THE ROLE OF PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS IN HEALTH CARE
DELIVERY 1 (2014); INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF NURSING: LEADING CHANGE, ADVANCING
HEALTH 3–6 (2011); MARIA SCHIFF, THE ROLE OF NURSE PRACTITIONERS IN MEETING
INCREASING DEMANDS FOR PRIMARY CARE 1 (2012); Jo Ann Jenkins, Advanced Practice
Nurses Play an Essential Role in Health Care, AARP (May 10, 2018), https://www.aarp.org
/health/health-insurance/info-2018/advanced-practice-nurses-healthcare.html [https://perma
.cc/JYU2-D5A8].
12. U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., U.S. DEP’T TREASURY & U.S. DEP’T LAB.,
REFORMING AMERICA’S HEALTHCARE SYSTEM THROUGH CHOICE AND COMPETITION 31–36
(2018); U.S. DEP’T TREASURY OFF. ECON. POL’Y, COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS & U.S. DEP’T
LAB., OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICYMAKERS 13–14 (2015).
13. See Benjamin J. McMichael, The Demand for Healthcare Regulation: The Effect of
Political Spending on Occupational Licensing Laws, 84 S. ECON. J. 297, 299–301, 306–09
(2017) (providing information on states that have relaxed their SOP laws and evidence that
political spending at the state level drives changes in these laws).
14. See, e.g., AMA, Memorial Resolutions Adopted Unanimously 238 (2017),
https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/ama-assn.org/files/corp/media-browser/public/hod/i17resolutions.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6SR-9Y8L] (“Resolution 214. APRN Compact . . .Our
[American Medical Association], in the public interest, opposes enactment of legislation to
authorize the independent practice of medicine by any individual who has not completed the
state’s requirements for licensure to engage in the practice of medicine and surgery in all of
its branches.”); see also infra Section IV.C (reviewing the debate over SOP laws in detail).
15. Benjamin J. McMichael, Barbara J. Safriet & Peter I. Buerhaus, The Extraregulatory
Effect of Nurse Practitioner Scope-of-Practice Laws on Physician Malpractice Rates, 75 MED.
CARE RES. & REV. 312, 313, 315–17 (2018).
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has demonstrated that tort liability can impact how providers deliver care, including
deterring them from providing unsafe care.16 For example, recent empirical research
has found that tort reforms, which decrease the liability risk faced by providers, can
reduce the incentives to invest in patient safety and increase the rate at which
preventable medical complications occur, suggesting that tort liability effectively
deters providers.17 While tort liability can result in overdeterrence, which may induce
the practice of defensive medicine—providing unnecessary treatment to avoid
liability—existing evidence is clear that malpractice liability influences how
providers care for patients.18 Research on the deterrent effect exerted by tort law has
focused almost exclusively on physicians, but APRNs and PAs may respond
similarly to physicians when faced with the threat of malpractice liability, as prior
work has demonstrated the similarity of care delivered by physicians, APRNs, and
PAs.19 Given the demonstrated ability of tort law to deter the provision of unsafe
care, the debate over SOP laws and the necessity of these laws to ensure patient
safety requires a simultaneous discussion of malpractice liability.
More importantly, however, evaluating SOP laws and malpractice liability
alongside one another is necessary because these two legal regimes may interact to
affect the delivery of healthcare by APRNs, PAs, and physicians. In particular,
restrictive SOP laws require that APRNs and PAs work closely with physicians—
often explicitly mandating physician supervision of APRNs and PAs. 20 This close
relationship may better enable patients injured as a result of negligence involving
APRNs and PAs to hold physicians liable under a variety of legal doctrines,

16. See, e.g., Ronen Avraham & Max Schanzenbach, The Impact of Tort Reform on
Intensity of Treatment: Evidence from Heart Patients, 39 J. HEALTH ECON. 273, 273 (2015)
(“We conclude that tort reform reduces treatment intensity overall, even though it changes the
mix of treatments.”); Janet Currie & W. Bentley MacLeod, First Do No Harm? Tort Reform
and Birth Outcomes, 123 Q.J. ECON. 795, 795 (2008) (“We find that reform of the Joint and
Several Liability rule (or the ‘deep pockets rule’) reduces complications of labor and
procedure use, whereas caps on noneconomic damages increase them.”).
17. Bernard S. Black, Amy R. Wagner & Zenon Zabinski, The Association Between
Patient Safety Indicators and Medical Malpractice Risk: Evidence from Florida and Texas, 3
AM. J. HEALTH ECON. 109, 109 (2017); Toshiaki Iizuka, Does Higher Malpractice Pressure
Deter Medical Errors, 56 J.L. & ECON. 161, 163 (2013).
18. See Michael Frakes & Anupam B. Jena, Does Medical Malpractice Law Improve
Health Care Quality?, 143 J. PUB. ECON. 142, 157–58 (2016) (defining and discussing
defensive medicine). See generally MICHELLE M. MELLO & ALLEN KACHALIA, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE: EVIDENCE ON REFORM ALTERNATIVES AND CLAIMS INVOLVING ELDERLY
PATIENTS (2016) (providing an extensive review of the available evidence on malpractice
liability and the provision of healthcare).
19. See, e.g., MARYJOAN D. LADDEN & SUSAN B. HASSMILLER, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON
FOUND., IMPROVING PATIENT ACCESS TO HIGH-QUALITY CARE: HOW TO FULLY UTILIZE THE
SKILLS, KNOWLEDGE, AND EXPERIENCE OF ADVANCED PRACTICE REGISTERED NURSES 8 (2013)
(noting that “[h]ealth outcomes are comparable for patients treated by primary care NPs and
MDs . . . .”).
20. Markowitz et al., supra note 10, at 203–04; McMichael, supra note 13, at 299–301,
306–09.
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including vicarious liability doctrines.21 In general, physicians can expect to face
higher liability costs when APRNs and PAs face restrictive SOP laws because
patients will find it easier to hold physicians liable for errors related to APRNs and
PAs. Similarly, because some patients will choose to pursue physicians instead of
APRNs and PAs when SOP laws are restrictive, APRNs and PAs can expect to face
lower liability costs. The liability cost shifting induced by restrictive SOP laws has
important implications for healthcare delivery based on prior work showing that
liability costs influence how providers care for patients.22
The purpose of this Article is to provide the first empirical evidence on the joint
role of malpractice liability and SOP laws in the provision of healthcare and, in so
doing, coalesce the debates over these two legal regimes. Prior work has shown that
allowing APRNs to practice without physician supervision can lower the rate at
which physicians pay out malpractice settlements and verdicts by as much as 31%. 23
However, no evidence exists on the joint role that SOP laws and malpractice liability
play in the delivery of healthcare. The absence of this evidence is particularly
problematic because the effect individual laws have on the provision of healthcare is
an important point of contention in the ongoing debate over SOP laws.
Throughout the empirical analysis, I focus on the provision of obstetric care
during childbirth, particularly the method of delivery chosen.24 According to the
World Health Organization, the rate of births via caesarean section (“C-section”) in
the United States is currently three times the recommended rate, which places both
mothers and infants at risk.25 Thus, obstetric care is a critically important context in
which to examine the patient-safety implications of both SOP laws and malpractice
liability. To do so, I analyze the effect of changes in the SOP laws governing APRNs
and PAs across states with different levels of malpractice pressure as measured by
the malpractice insurance premiums paid by physicians in that state. 26 If malpractice
liability modulates the way SOP laws affect how physicians, APRNs, and PAs
provide care, then changes in SOP laws will have different effects on the provision
of obstetric care in states with high and low levels of malpractice pressure.
I analyze a restricted-use dataset obtained from the National Center for Health
Statistics (NCHS), which contains details on every recorded birth in the United States

21. McMichael et al., supra note 15, at 315–17 (discussing the various legal doctrines
that allow plaintiffs to more easily establish physician liability when a state maintains
restrictive SOP laws).
22. See Y. Tony Yang, David M. Studdert, S. V. Subramanian & Michelle M. Mello,
Does Tort Law Improve the Health of Newborns, or Miscarry? A Longitudinal Analysis of the
Effect of Liability Pressure on Birth Outcomes, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 217, 231–36
(2012) (finding that providers alter their behavior in response to changes in liability risk).
23. McMichael et al., supra note 15 at 321.
24. Markowitz et al., supra note 10, at 209–16.
25. AP Betrán, MR Torloni, JJ Zhang & AM Gulmezoglu, WHO Statement on Caesarean
Section Rates, 123 BJOG 667, 667 (2015).
26. I use the term “malpractice pressure” throughout this article to refer generally to the
risk of malpractice liability. Doing so better captures the function of risk in this context—
pressuring providers to perform certain procedures—and is consistent with prior research in
this area. See, e.g., Iizuka, supra note 17, at 161 (using the term “pressure” to refer to
malpractice liability risk).
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between 1998 and 2015. The primary empirical models contain over 69 million
observations, and because the dataset is the same one used in the calculation of the
official birth statistics by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),27
the empirical results here represent the best available evidence on the roles of SOP
laws and malpractice liability in the delivery of obstetric care.
In general, the empirical analysis reveals that the degree of malpractice pressure
modulates the effect that SOP laws have on the provision of healthcare. For example,
consistent with prior work,28 I find that allowing APRNs and PAs to practice with
more autonomy reduces the use of medically intensive procedures in labor and
delivery, including delivery via C-section. Extending the analysis, I find that relaxing
SOP laws reduces C-sections when malpractice pressure is low but has almost no
effect when malpractice pressure is high. I find similar results for other outcomes,
including medical inductions of labor. These results suggest SOP laws impact the
delivery of healthcare differently across different levels of malpractice pressure.
The evidence developed in the empirical analysis demonstrates a clear and
pervasive interaction between SOP laws and malpractice liability, and this
interaction has a salient effect on the provision of healthcare. Thus, the analysis
demonstrates the importance of considering the role of malpractice liability
alongside SOP laws in the continued debate over the necessity of these laws. More
importantly, the results of the analysis point to a potential resolution to the
increasingly heated debate over SOP laws. Tort law and SOP laws share the goals of
protecting patient safety and promoting the delivery of high-quality healthcare, even
if they differ in their approaches to achieving these goals. However, because
restrictive SOP laws effectively shift liability risk from APRNs and PAs to
physicians, these laws necessarily distort the incentives to provide safe and highquality care created by tort law.
Based on the empirical analysis, which bears out this distortion of incentives, I
join the National Academy of Medicine and others in calling for the elimination of
restrictive SOP laws. Importantly, however, my recommendation differs from prior
calls to abrogate these laws by providing, in tort law, a specific alternative
mechanism on which states can rely to accomplish the goal that justified the
introduction of SOP laws in the first place—ensuring patient safety. The empirical
evidence presented here demonstrates that tort law exerts a deterrent effect on
APRNs and PAs and that this effect is stronger when they bear more of their own
liability risk in the absence of restrictive SOP laws. While the medical malpractice
system as currently implemented is far from perfect and efforts to reform it should
certainly continue,29 malpractice liability can deter individual providers and can do

27. See, e.g., Joyce A. Martin, Brady E. Hamilton, Michelle J.K. Osterman, Anne K.
Driscoll & T.J. Mathews, Births: Final Data for 2015, 66 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP. 1, 2–3
(2017) (using the same dataset as that used here).
28. See Markowitz et al., supra note 10, at 216 (finding that relaxed SOP laws lead to
“lower observed probabilities of labor inductions, C-sections, apparent elective inductions,
and apparent elective C-sections relative to states with [restrictive SOP laws]”).
29. See, e.g., Yang et al., supra note 22, at 218 (explaining that “[d]efensive medicine is
deterrence gone awry” and noting that its practice may be induced by the current malpractice
system). Based on the nature of the analysis presented here, the extent to which providers
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so without generating the substantial harms to patients that prior work has attributed
to restrictive SOP laws (e.g., impeding access to care and raising the costs of care).30
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I discusses healthcare providers and the
SOP laws that govern them. Part II provides an overview of the malpractice liability
these providers may face. Part III empirically investigates the roles that these two
seemingly disparate, but intimately related, legal regimes play in the provision of
healthcare. Part IV discusses the primary policy implications of this analysis and uses
the results of the analysis to provide a new path forward in resolving the heated and
ongoing debate over SOP laws. An online technical appendix provides the
econometric details of the main analysis and offers relevant supplementary
analyses.31
I.

LICENSING HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS

While physicians have historically delivered most of the healthcare in the United
States, this trend has changed recently, with APRNs and PAs providing more care
traditionally reserved to physicians.32 Indeed, the growth rates for APRNs and PAs
significantly outstrip those for physicians—particularly in primary care specialties
where the physician shortage is most acute—suggesting that APRNs and PAs will
only deliver a greater proportion of care in the United States going forward.33 This
Part first provides an overview of APRNs, PAs, and their roles in providing care,
with a focus on obstetric care. It then details the SOP laws that govern these providers
and engages with the existing evidence on the effects these laws have on APRNs,
PAs, their patients, and the healthcare system.

practice defensive medicine is beyond the scope of this Article. Future work can investigate
the extent of defensive medicine in more detail.
30. See Kleiner et al., supra note 10, at 276–77 (highlighting the propensity of restrictive
SOP laws to increase the price of healthcare); McMichael, supra note 4, at 759–64
(highlighting the propensity of restrictive SOP laws to impede access to healthcare).
31. Benjamin J. McMichael, Healthcare Licensing and Liability: Technical Appendix (U.
Ala. Legal Stud., Res. Paper No. 3357906, 2019) [hereinafter Technical Appendix],
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3357906
[https://perma.cc/ST3VHYLW].
32. David I. Auerbach, Douglas O. Staiger & Peter I. Buerhaus, Growing Ranks of
Advanced Practice Clinicians—Implications for the Physician Workforce, 378 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 2358, 2358 (2018) (“A growing share of health care services are being provided by
advanced practice registered nurses (APRNs), particularly nurse practitioners (NPs), who
make up the majority of APRNs, and by physician assistants (PAs).”).
33. E. Kathleen Adams & Sara Markowitz, Loosening Restrictions on the Scope of
Practice for PAs, 32 J. AM. ACAD. PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS 8, 8 (2019) (“The growth in the
supply of PAs between 2016 and 2026 is projected to exceed that of [nurse practitioners] and
indeed, all diagnosing and health-treating practitioners.”); Edward Salsberg, Changes in the
Pipeline of New NPs and RNs: Implications for Health Care Delivery and Educational
Capacity, HEALTH AFF.: HEALTH AFF. BLOG (June 5, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do
/10.1377/hblog20180524.993081/full/ [https://perma.cc/78XT-F4H9] (“The number of new
nurse practitioners (NPs) graduating each year continues to rise rapidly and will likely exceed
the annual number of new physicians completing training in the next few years.”).
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A. Advanced Practice Registered Nurses and Physician Assistants
APRNs are registered nurses who have undergone additional training—typically
completing a master’s degree or professional doctorate—and practice in a wide
variety of medical specialties. The term “APRN” includes four different types of
nursing professionals: nurse practitioners (NPs), certified nurse midwives (CNMs),
certified registered nurse anesthetists (CRNAs), and clinical nurse specialists
(CNSs).34 NPs and CNSs practice in a wide range of specialties,35 while CNMs and
CRNAs practice almost exclusively in obstetrics/gynecology and anesthesiology,
respectively.36 PAs are healthcare professionals who have completed training—
usually resulting in a graduate degree—to provide healthcare in different
specialties.37 Both APRNs and PAs may diagnose and treat patients, order and
interpret tests, and write prescriptions.38
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, there were approximately 180,000
NPs, 6300 CNMs, 44,000 CRNAs, and 115,000 PAs practicing in 2018.39 Compared
to physicians, APRNs and PAs are more likely to practice in primary care and to
provide care to underserved populations, including Medicaid beneficiaries.40 APRNs
and PAs currently outnumber family and general practice physicians and are the
principal source of care in some parts of the country.41 While APRNs and PAs
receive relatively less formal training than physicians—eighteen months to three
years for the former and upwards of seven to eight years for the latter—they function
similarly to physicians in a variety of healthcare settings.42 And there is a near
consensus in the clinical literature that, when providing care within the scope of their
education and training, the healthcare outcomes of APRNs and PAs equal or exceed
those of physicians.43 To be sure, APRNs and PAs complete less training than

34. ADAMS & MARKOWITZ, supra note 9, at 9.
35. NPs tend to focus more specifically on patient care and can prescribe medications,
while CNSs generally focus on patient care, management, and administration and often do not
prescribe medications. Nurse Practitioner vs. Clinical Nurse Specialist, NP SCHOOLS,
https://www.nursepractitionerschools.com/faq/np-vs-cns [https://perma.cc/7C4Q-494U].
36. Certified Nurse Midwife, NURSE, https://nurse.org/resources/certified-nurse-midwife/
[https://perma.cc/B338-X9LN]; Nurse Anesthetist, NURSE, https://nurse.org/resources/nurseanesthetist/ [https://perma.cc/E8TB-9YLG].
37. ADAMS & MARKOWITZ, supra note 9, at 8–9.
38. Id. at 8–10; McMichael, supra note 4, at 734–35.
39. The Bureau of Labor Statistics does not separately count CNSs. Occupational
Employment Statistics: May 2018 Occupation Profiles, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT.,
https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes_stru.htm#29-0000 [https://perma.cc/K2LT-QDFJ].
40. Peter I. Buerhaus, Catherine M. DesRoches, Robert Dittus & Karen Donelan,
Practice Characteristics of Primary Care Nurse Practitioners and Physicians, 63 NURSING
OUTLOOK 144, 144–53 (2015); McMichael, supra note 4, at 759–64; Kevin Stange, How Does
Provider Supply and Regulation Influence Health Care Markets? Evidence from Nurse
Practitioners and Physician Assistants, 33 J. HEALTH ECON. 1, 1–3 (2014).
41. Auerbach, supra note 4, at 607–608; Auerbach et al., supra note 32, at 2358–59.
42. ADAMS & MARKOWITZ, supra note 9, at 8–10; McMichael, supra note 4, at 734–36.
43. See generally MIRANDA LAURANT, MIEKE VAN DER BIEZEN, NANCY WIJERS,
Kanokwaroon WATANANIRUN, EVANGELOS KONTOPANTELIS & ANNEKE JAH VAN VUGHT,
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physicians and therefore cannot provide all of the services delivered by physicians—
they do not, for example, perform major surgery. However, within certain healthcare
settings—primary care being the prime example—APRNs and PAs perform similar
functions as physicians with similar patient outcomes.44
Both APRNs and PAs deliver obstetric and gynecological care. Recent work
estimated that CNMs, NPs specializing in women’s health, and PAs make up
approximately 18%, 15%, and 2% of the women’s health workforce, respectively. 45
Conducting a systematic review of studies involving comparisons between CNMs
and physicians, a large team of clinicians and researchers led by Meg Johantgen
concluded that CNMs employ interventions, such as epidurals and medical induction
of labor, less than physicians but that infant health outcomes do not differ across
CNMs and physicians.46 Women’s health NPs (and other types of NPs) do not
provide obstetric care as CNMs do—they do not generally participate in labor and
delivery—but they do provide other services, including prenatal care, that can
ultimately affect obstetric outcomes (e.g., by intervening early to prevent or stop
preterm labor).47 Similarly, PAs do not participate in obstetric care to the same extent
as CNMs, but they are trained to provide neonatal and obstetric/gynecological care.48
And PAs may provide some services that overlap with CNMs, such as labor
management and normal deliveries.49
Of note is the fact that APRNs and PAs do not, themselves, perform C-sections. 50
As major surgery, this would be outside the training of APRNs and PAs, though they
could certainly assist with the surgery and may be involved in the initial stages of
labor prior to the C-section. If an APRN or PA is initially responsible for a normal
delivery and later determines that the patient requires a C-section, the APRN or PA
would refer the patient to a physician. As noted in a recent study by Sara Markowitz
and colleagues, this decision of whether and when to refer a patient for a C-section
is sensitive to the SOP laws governing providers.51 These laws may also impair
access to APRNs and PAs by discouraging these providers from practicing in certain

NURSES AS SUBSTITUTES FOR DOCTORS IN PRIMARY CARE (REVIEW) (2019) (reviewing the
available evidence); GILMAN & KOSLOV, supra note 8 (same).
44. LAURANT ET AL., supra note 43, at 2–3.
45. Oren Berkowitz & Susan E. White, An Opportunity for PAs as Obstetrical Laborists,
31 J. AM. ACAD. PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS 40, 40 (2018).
46. Meg Johantgen, Lily Fountain, George Zangaro, Robin Newhouse, Julie Stanik-Hutt
& Kathleen White, Comparison of Labor and Delivery Care Provided by Certified NurseMidwives and Physicians: A Systematic Review, 1990 to 2008, 22 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES
e73, e75–80 (2012).
47. Berkowitz & White, supra note 45, at 40–42; Jennifer Doyle & Angela Silber,
Preterm Labor: Role of the Nurse Practitioner, 40 NURSE PRACTITIONER 49, 50–54 (2015).
48. Kelly Donkers, Judy Truscott, Carl Garrubba & Deborah DeLong, High-Fidelity
Simulation Use in Preparation of Physician Assistant Students for Neonatal and Obstetric
Care, 27 J. PHYSICIAN ASSISTANT EDUC. 68, 68–72 (2016); Tamara S. Ritsema & Amy M.
Klingler, Can PAs Help Address the Pressing Public Health Problem of Rising Maternal
Mortality?, 31 J. AM. ACAD. PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS 11, 11–12 (2018).
49. Berkowitz & White, supra note 45, at 40–42.
50. Id.
51. Markowitz et al., supra note 10, at 216.
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areas.52 This impaired access, in turn, may affect C-section rates because APRNs and
PAs may steer patients away from C-sections to a greater extent than physicians.53
The next subsection provides more details on SOP laws.
B. Scope-of-Practice Laws
While APRNs and PAs function similarly to physicians and achieve comparable
healthcare outcomes among their patients, they—unlike physicians—face
substantial state variation in the occupational licensing laws that govern how they
may provide care.54 Occupational licensing laws govern many aspects of APRN and
PA practices, but the most important subset of these laws are the SOP laws that
determine what services APRNs and PAs may provide and under what conditions
they may provide them. Prior work has classified APRN and PA SOP laws in
different ways.55 While each classification scheme has its own advantages and
disadvantages, I follow a version of the scheme provided in two recent studies that
relied on specific statutory and regulatory language (instead of secondary sources)
to classify individual state SOP laws. 56 This approach to classification minimizes the
risk of inconsistent statutory and regulatory interpretation, which may occur when
relying on various secondary sources. It also isolates specific SOP laws that
policymakers may focus on changing in the future, instead of considering a broad
range of disparate laws to arrive at overly general—and potentially less useful to
policymakers—categorizations of SOP laws.57
In particular, the approach adopted here focuses on both the physician supervision
requirements imposed on APRNs and PAs and the prescriptive authority granted to
APRNs and PAs, thereby isolating the specific laws that have the largest impacts on
the care delivered by APRNs and PAs.58 I classify a state as allowing “APRN
independence” if it (1) requires no physician supervision of APRNs and (2) grants
APRNs full prescriptive authority (i.e., effectively places no more restrictions on

52. McMichael, supra note 4, at 749–59.
53. Id.
54. See Safriet, supra note 6, at 317–23 (providing an overview of SOP laws).
55. For example, Sara Markowitz and colleagues considered a variety of restrictions on
CNMs to broadly classify states as having “no barriers” to CNMs providing care, “low
barriers,” “moderate barriers,” or “high barriers.” Markowitz et al., supra note 10, at 203–04.
In contrast, a study led by Morris Kleiner focused on physician supervision requirements as
they pertain to prescriptions and classified the SOP laws governing NPs by whether they
allowed “limited prescription authority,” “supervised or delegated prescription authority,” or
“independent prescription authority.” Kleiner et al., supra note 10, at 266–67.
56. See McMichael, supra note 4, at 734–37 (discussing the classification of SOP laws);
McMichael, supra note 13, at 299 (same).
57. This is not to suggest that other classification schemes are “wrong.” Indeed, though
they focus on somewhat different statutes and regulations, the ultimate classification schemes
used in prior work are often highly correlated with one another. Compare Markowitz et al.,
supra note 10, at 203–04, and Kleiner et al., supra note 10, at 266–67, with McMichael, supra
note 4, at 734–37.
58. Other SOP laws may affect APRNs and PAs, but laws such as the ability to sign death
certificates or issue handicap placards have smaller impacts on the ability of APRNs and PAs
to care for patients generally.
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APRNs’ prescriptive authority than on physicians’).59 Similarly, I classify a state as
allowing “PA autonomy” 60 if it (1) allows PAs to practice at remote sites with visits
from their supervising physicians required no more than monthly and (2) grants PAs
full prescriptive authority (i.e., effectively places no more restrictions on PAs than
on physicians).61
This categorization of laws also has the advantage of focusing specifically on the
SOP laws that are most salient in connecting APRNs and PAs to physicians. These
connections are critically important for evaluating the role of malpractice liability as
described in detail below.62 Table A1 in the Technical Appendix provides an
overview of state SOP laws between 1998 and 2015—the beginning and end of the
period considered here.63 With respect to the SOP laws considered here, two details
are particularly important. First, while the trend has been decidedly in favor of
granting APRNs and PAs more autonomy and authority, states do not relax the SOP
laws governing APRNs and PAs simultaneously, so the patterns of changes in the
laws for APRNs and PAs are different.64 Second, while these laws come from prior
work focusing on NPs and not APRNs generally, a review of the statutory language
confirms that the laws considered here apply to CNMs as well as NPs. 65 Although
these laws do not apply to CRNAs and CNSs, these providers play smaller roles in
the provision of obstetric and gynecological care, and are therefore not the focus of
the analysis presented here.66 Accordingly, the results pertaining to APRN SOP laws
reported below should be interpreted in the context of NPs and CNMs as opposed to
all four types of APRNs.
The current literature on occupational licensing laws focuses heavily on the role
these laws play in professional labor markets and healthcare output markets, with
relatively little emphasis on SOP laws or the effect of these laws on the provision of
healthcare. For example, several studies have considered the effects of licensing laws
on the labor market outcomes (including earnings and hours worked) of NPs, PAs,
and physicians.67 Generally, NP earnings increase and physician earnings decrease

59. McMichael, supra note 4, at 734–37; McMichael, supra note 13, at 299.
60. For ease of exposition, I refer to PAs as practicing autonomously; however, they are
never allowed to practice without some level of physician involvement.
61. McMichael, supra note 4, at 734–37; McMichael, supra note 13, at 299.
62. See infra Section II.B.
63. Technical Appendix, supra note 31.
64. McMichael, supra note 4, at 734–37.
65. Overall, statutes generally treat CNMs and NPs the same, with a few exceptions that
are often limited to the prescriptive authority of CNMs while actively caring for laboring
mothers in a hospital. See Markowitz et al., supra note 10, at 203–04; McMichael, supra note
4, at 734–37.
66. I do not mean to suggest that CRNAs and CNSs play no role in obstetric care. CRNAs
often provide anesthesia services in labor and delivery settings, and CNSs may play important
roles in managing pre-, peri-, and postnatal care. The roles of CRNAs and CNSs warrant future
investigation. However, these providers are not the focus of this study since they do not
provide obstetric and gynecological care to the extent that the other providers considered here
do and are not generally considered part of the women’s health workforce. See Berkowitz &
White, supra note 45, at 40–42.
67. See, e.g., Michael J. Dueker, Ada K. Jacox, David E. Kalist & Stephen J. Spurr, The
Practice Boundaries of Advanced Practice Nurses: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 27 J.
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when the former gain greater authority and independence from the latter.68
Consistent with this evidence, prior research examining the effect of different
licensing and SOP laws on the supplies of APRNs and PAs has found evidence that
more of these providers practice in areas with less restrictive SOP laws. 69
With respect to output markets, multiple studies have confirmed that granting NPs
and PAs greater authority leads to reduced prices and lower healthcare
expenditures.70 In particular, the price of a common medical examination decreases
by 3% to 16% when NPs gain greater independence,71 the savings achieved by using
retail health clinics instead of emergency departments are higher when NPs have
more independence,72 and Medicaid costs either decrease or remain flat when NPs
and PAs are granted more authority.73 Kevin Stange found that a greater supply of
NPs and PAs had relatively little impact on the office-based healthcare market.
However, he concluded that healthcare markets are more responsive to changes in
NP and PA supply when these providers possess more autonomy, suggesting that
restrictive SOP laws may blunt the effect NPs and PAs can have on healthcare
markets.74

REG. ECON. 309, 309 (2005) (“We find that in States where APNs have acquired a substantial
amount of professional independence, the earnings of APNs are substantially lower, and those
of physicians’ assistants (PAs) are substantially higher, than in other States.”); Kleiner et al.,
supra note 10, at 261 (“We find that when nurse practitioners have more independence in their
scope of practice, their wages are higher but physicians’ wages are lower . . . .”); John J. Perry,
The Rise and Impact of Nurse Practitioners and Physician Assistants on Their Own and CrossOccupation Incomes, 27 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 491, 491 (2009) (“It is found that changes in
NP and PA regulatory authority do impact the labor markets of [NPs, PAs, and physicians].”).
68. Kleiner et al., supra note 10, at 261.
69. See, e.g., McMichael, supra note 4, at 732 (“Relaxing licensing laws to allow NPs to
practice with less physician oversight increases the supply of NPs in areas with few practicing
physicians by 60 percent . . . .”); Patricia B. Reagan & Pamela J. Salsberry, The Effects of
State-Level Scope-of-Practice Regulations on the Number and Growth of Nurse Practitioners,
61 NURSING OUTLOOK 392, 392 (2013) (“Restrictive [SOP laws] reduced the number of NPs
by about 10 per 100,000 and reduced the growth rate by 25%.”).
70. The literature on occupational licensing laws is not limited to APRNs and PAs. See,
e.g., EDWARD J. TIMMONS, JASON M. HOCKENBERRY & CHRISTINE PIETTE DURRANCE,
MERCATUS RES., MORE BATTLES AMONG LICENSED OCCUPATIONS: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS
OF SCOPE OF PRACTICE AND DIRECT ACCESS ON THE CHIROPRACTIC, PHYSICAL THERAPIST, AND
PHYSICIAN LABOR MARKET 18–19, 25 (2016) (examining the laws governing chiropractors,
physical therapists, and physicians); Morris M. Kleiner & Kyoung Won Park, Battles Among
Licensed Occupations: Analyzing Government Regulations on Labor Market Outcomes for
Dentists and Hygienists 19–20 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16560,
2010) (examining dentists and dental hygienists).
71. Kleiner et al., supra note 10, at 276–77.
72. Joanne Spetz, Stephen T. Parente, Robert J. Town & Dawn Bazarko, Scope-OfPractice Laws for Nurse Practitioners Limit Cost Savings That Can Be Achieved in Retail
Clinics, 32 HEALTH AFF. 1977, 1980–82 (2013).
73. Edward Joseph Timmons, The Effects of Expanded Nurse Practitioner and Physician
Assistant Scope of Practice on the Cost of Medicaid Patient Care, 121 HEALTH POL’Y 189,
193–95 (2017).
74. Stange, supra note 40, at 9–15.
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Relatedly, recent work has found that relaxing SOP laws can result in greater
access to care and increased utilization of primary care services. For example,
relaxing SOP laws increases access to healthcare most in the counties that have the
least access to care,75 and NPs treat more Medicare patients in states with less
restrictive SOP laws.76 Conducting a wide-ranging study, Jeffrey Traczynski and
Victoria Udalova found that granting NPs more autonomy increases access to care,
lowers barriers to care, increases self-reported quality of care, increases the use of
medical care in underserved populations, reduces the use of emergency departments
for primary care, and reduces healthcare costs by up to 1.3%.77
Perhaps most related to the analysis presented below is the recent study conducted
by Markowitz and colleagues.78 Focusing on obstetric care, the Markowitz team
found that SOP laws have few effects on maternal health behaviors or infant health
outcomes.79 However, states with less restrictive laws have lower rates of labor
inductions and C-sections (including elective inductions and C-sections), suggesting
that relaxing SOP laws leads to the provision of lower intensity care with no
offsetting costs in terms of health outcomes.80 The analysis presented below extends
the work of the Markowitz team by examining a potential mechanism which may
interact with SOP laws to affect the provision of healthcare—malpractice liability.
As discussed in detail below, the malpractice pressure exerted on different types of
providers may vary depending on the SOP laws in place because these laws may
shift liability for medical errors between different providers.81 Additionally, this
study builds on the work of Traczynski and Udalova and the Markowitz group by
examining both APRNs and PAs—with the notable exception of the 2014 study
conducted by Stange, most of the work on SOP laws has excluded PAs from
consideration.82
II. HOLDING HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS LIABLE
Like physicians and other professionals, APRNs and PAs may be held liable for
malpractice when they negligently injure patients. And prior work has demonstrated
the potential of malpractice liability to substantially impact healthcare providers, the
healthcare system, and the provision of care. However, despite a robust debate over
the importance of malpractice liability in the healthcare system, malpractice liability
is rarely, if ever, mentioned in the debate over SOP laws. This Part engages with the
evidence on the effect of malpractice liability on the healthcare system, with a focus
on obstetric care, before tracing the legal connections between liability and SOP

75. McMichael, supra note 4, at 744–45.
76. Yong-Fang Kuo, Figaro L. Loresto Jr., Linda R. Rounds & James S. Goodwin, States
with the Least Restrictive Regulations Experienced the Largest Increase in Patients Seen by
Nurse Practitioners, 32 HEALTH AFF. 1236, 1238–41 (2013).
77. Jeffrey Traczynski & Victoria Udalova, Nurse Practitioner Independence, Health
Care Utilization, and Health Outcomes, 58 J. HEALTH ECON. 90, 104 (2018).
78. Markowitz et al., supra note 10, at 204–08.
79. Id. at 209–16.
80. Id. at 209–10.
81. See infra Part II.
82. Stange, supra note 40, at 1.
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laws. The evidentiary and legal foundation laid here provides the basis for the
empirical analysis presented in the next section.
A. Malpractice Liability and the Provision of Healthcare
By allowing individuals harmed by another’s negligence—here, malpractice—to
recover damages, tort law both compensates victims for their injuries and deters
wrongdoers—negligent providers—from engaging in tortious behavior in the first
instance. While the compensatory role played by tort law is certainly important,83 its
ability to deter negligence—the provision of substandard, low-quality, or unsafe
healthcare—is at least as important and has garnered attention from researchers and
policymakers alike.84 The current literature on the role of malpractice liability in the
healthcare system can be broadly categorized into two strands, though there is some
overlap between the two. In the first, studies focus on the general question of the
extent to which malpractice liability impacts how providers deliver care, particularly
whether it deters them from the provision of unsafe or low-quality care. In the
second, studies focus more narrowly on the question of defensive medicine, which
is “a deviation from sound medical practice that is induced primarily by a threat of
liability”—in other words, a problem of overdeterrence.85
Beginning with the first, and more general, strand of research, the evidence
demonstrates that malpractice liability exerts meaningful deterrence on providers.
For example, Bernard Black and colleagues examined “the association between rates
of adverse patient safety events and rates for paid medical malpractice claims” and
concluded that “hospitals can meaningfully reduce malpractice claims by investing
in patient safety.”86 Indeed, their finding that “a one standard deviation reduction in
[standardized patient safety measures] would decrease paid malpractice claims by
about 16 percent” demonstrates a clear relationship between malpractice liability and
patient safety.87 Examining a similar set of patient safety measures, Toshiaki Iizuka
similarly concluded that “higher liability pressure reduces preventable medical
complications,” consistent with tort law exerting a deterrent effect on providers.88

83. Frakes & Jena, supra note 18, at 142 (“The imposition of liability under tort law is
sometimes said to serve a purely private function—to correct the injustice created by a
wrongdoer and/or to provide compensation to those harmed by that wrongdoer.”).
84. See Black et al., supra note 17, at 109 (“A central goal of tort liability is to deter risky
or negligent behavior by imposing liability on the ‘acting’ party for harm to an injured party.”);
Yang et al., supra note 22, at 217–18 (“In the context of medical malpractice, conventional
tort theory suggests that health-care providers who face the threat or imposition of economic
and noneconomic penalties for rendering negligent care will take socially optimal levels of
precautions, thus improving the quality of care and health outcomes.”). See generally MELLO
& KACHALIA, supra note 18, at 9–12 (reviewing the studies focusing on tort law’s ability to
deter providers and reforms aimed at modifying this deterrence role).
85. David M. Studdert, Michelle M. Mello, William M. Sage, Catherine M. DesRoches,
Jordon Peugh, Kinga Zapert & Troyen A Brennan, Defensive Medicine Among High-Risk
Specialist Physicians in a Volatile Malpractice Environment, 293 JAMA 2609, 2609 (2005).
86. Black et al., supra note 17, at 110.
87. Id. at 111.
88. Iizuka, supra note 17, at 164.
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Because of the sensitivity of obstetric care to malpractice pressure,89 multiple
studies have investigated the role of liability risk in the provision of obstetric care.
Measuring malpractice pressure directly with the malpractice insurance premiums
paid by physicians and examining the effect of malpractice liability on labor and
delivery outcomes, Tony Yang and colleagues concluded that “higher malpractice
premiums for obstetrician-gynecologists stimulate greater use of cesarean section
and reduced rates of VBAC [vaginal birth after a C-section],” which is suggestive of
a deterrence role for tort law.90 Taking a different approach by focusing on the
specific deterrence malpractice claims can have on individual physicians—instead
of examining the general deterrence exerted by malpractice pressure—Ity Shurtz
analyzed the effect of malpractice claims on the provision of obstetric care.91 He
found that C-section rates increased between 4% and 8% after a physician faced a
successful malpractice claim (i.e., one that led to a payment).92 Thus, Shurtz
demonstrated that tort law generally and tort claims specifically can deter physicians
and impact how they deliver care. Along the same lines, David Dranove and
Yasutora Watanabe examined the effect of lawsuits filed against individual
physicians and physicians who practiced in the same hospital.93 They found similar,
though somewhat smaller, effects as reported by Shurtz.94
Approaching the issue of deterrence from yet another angle, Michael Frakes and
Anupam Jena concentrated on healthcare quality, liability pressure, and the question
of “pressure to do what?”95 Examining changes in the standards of care against which
physicians’ actions are judged and their effect on obstetric complications (among
other outcomes), Frakes and Jena concluded that “medical liability forces—under
the right structural framework—hold the potential to elevate the quality floor.”96
Noting that some prior work had found mixed results on the deterrent effect exerted

89. Beomsoo Kim, The Impact of Malpractice Risk on the Use of Obstetrics Procedures,
36 J. LEGAL STUD. S79, S82–85 (2007). See generally Michelle M. Mello & Carly N. Kelly,
Effects of a Professional Liability Crisis on Residents’ Practice Decisions, 105 OBSTETRICS
& GYNECOLOGY 1287, at 1290–94 (2005); Michelle M. Mello, David M. Studdert, Catherine
M. DesRoches, Jordon Peugh, Kinga Zapert, Troyen A. Brennan & William M. Sage, Effects
of a Malpractice Crisis on Specialist Supply and Patient Access to Care, 242 ANNALS SURG.
621, at 623–25 (2005); Studdert et al., supra note 85, at 2612–14.
90. Y. Tony Yang, Michelle M. Mello, S.V. Subramanian & David M. Studdert,
Relationship Between Malpractice Litigation Pressure and Rates of Cesarean Section and
Vaginal Birth After Cesarean Section, 47 MED. CARE 234, 238 (2009).
91. Ity Shurtz, The Impact of Medical Errors on Physician Behavior: Evidence from
Malpractice Litigation, 32 J. HEALTH ECON. 331, 332–35 (2013).
92. Id. at 332. Shurtz explains that “fear of lawsuits affects treatment patterns and may
encourage high-cost, low-benefit medical treatment (‘defensive medicine’).” Id. at 331–32.
With this possibility in mind, Shurtz’s study “examine[d] the impact of physicians’ medical
errors on their subsequent behavior . . . .” Id. at 332.
93. David Dranove & Yasutora Watanabe, Influence and Deterrence: How Obstetricians
Respond to Litigation Against Themselves and Their Colleagues, 12 AM. L. ECON. REV. 69,
69–74 (2010).
94. Id.
95. Frakes & Jena, supra note 18, at 143.
96. Id. at 144.
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by tort law,97 the authors cautioned against “rul[ing] out medical liability from the
health care quality discussion based on” these studies.98 In earlier work, Frakes
examined the effect of changes in the standard of care on physician practice
patterns.99 He found that the movement from a standard based on local practices to
one based on national practices led to a decline in regional variation in care.100 Based
on this evidence, he concluded that “the law holds the potential to deter particular
clinical practices.”101
While not all studies that have investigated the effect of malpractice liability on
healthcare generally or obstetric care specifically have found evidence of a deterrent
effect,102 the weight of the evidence suggests that malpractice liability impacts the
delivery of care and deters individual providers.103 Indeed, the propensity of
physicians to respond to the threat of liability has sparked an intense debate over
whether malpractice liability overdeters providers, which has, in turn, led to concerns
about the practice of defensive medicine.104 Generally speaking, “[d]efensive
medicine is deterrence gone awry,” as providers perform tests and procedures not
because they are medically indicated but to avoid liability in the future.105
The existence and pervasiveness of defensive medicine form the basis of the
second strand of research focusing on malpractice liability and healthcare, and
Frakes and Jena provide an extensive discussion of why the more narrow and
nuanced question of defensive medicine should be separated from the more general
question of deterrence.106 While the extent to which defensive medicine is practiced
remains a contentious issue, prior studies have revealed some evidence that providers
practice defensively. For example, Katherine Baicker and several coauthors found
that a 10% increase in the average payment to a patient who has asserted a
malpractice claim was associated with up to a 1.8% increase in the use of diagnostic

97. See, e.g., Lisa Dubay, Robert Kaestner & Timothy Waidmann, The Impact of
Malpractice Fears on Caesarean Section Rates, 18 J. HEALTH ECON. 491, 491 (1999) (finding
only small effects of malpractice pressure on obstetric outcomes).
98. Frakes & Jena, supra note 18, at 158.
99. Michael Frakes, The Impact of Medical Liability Standards on Regional Variations
in Physician Behavior: Evidence from the Adoption of National-Standard Rules, 103 AM.
ECON. REV. 257, 257–60 (2013).
100. Id. at 267–71.
101. Id. at 275.
102. See, e.g., Gilbert W. Gimm, The Impact of Malpractice Liability Claims on
Obstetrical Practice Patterns, 45 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 195, 195 (2010) (“I did not find
evidence that physicians changed their practice patterns by increasing C-section rates in
response to malpractice claims.”); Kim, supra note 89, at S84 (“My findings demonstrate that
c-section rates are not responsive to medical malpractice risk.”).
103. See generally MELLO & KACHALIA, supra note 18, at 1–2 (providing a thorough
evaluation of the role of malpractice liability in the healthcare system).
104. For a review of the ongoing debate over defensive medicine, see Benjamin J.
McMichael, The Failure of “Sorry”: An Empirical Evaluation of Apology Laws, Health Care,
and Medical Malpractice, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1199. 1200–02 (2018).
105. Yang et al., supra note 22, at 218.
106. Frakes & Jena, supra note 18, at 157.
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tests,107 and Brandon Roberts and Irving Hoch concluded that Medicare spending
increases by nearly $2.50 per beneficiary for every additional lawsuit per 100,000
county residents.108
With respect to obstetric care, some evidence suggests that providers respond to
malpractice liability consistent with the practice of defensive medicine. For example,
following up on their original study which showed changes in C-section and VBAC
rates in response to malpractice pressure,109 Yang and colleagues found that
indicators of adverse birth outcomes remained unchanged when malpractice pressure
increased.110 This suggests that providers practice defensively, as they change how
they treat patients, with little effect on adverse outcomes.111
The traditional response to the practice of defensive medicine and to medical
malpractice liability crises more generally has been the passage of tort reforms,
which are designed to limit malpractice pressure on providers.112 Despite these
intentions, the evidence is mixed on whether tort reforms reduce malpractice
pressure and the practice of defensive medicine (or change the treatment decisions
of providers more generally).113 In early work, Daniel Kessler and Mark McClellan
found that tort reforms which directly reduce malpractice pressure, such as caps on
noneconomic damages, decrease hospital expenditures by 5% to 9% for patients
suffering from cardiac episodes, with little change in medical complications or
mortality rates.114 Examining a similar patient population, a more recent study also
found that noneconomic damages caps reduce the probability that a patient suffering
from a heart attack receives relatively more intensive and invasive treatment, with
no attendant increase in mortality rates.115 Reviewing the available evidence,

107. Katherine Baicker, Elliott S. Fisher & Amitabh Chandra, Malpractice Liability Costs
and the Practice of Medicine in the Medicare Program, 26 HEALTH AFF. 841, 847–48 (2007).
108. Brandon Roberts & Irving Hoch, Malpractice Litigation and Medical Costs in
Mississippi, 16 HEALTH ECON. 841, 846 (2007).
109. Yang et al., supra note 90, at 237–40; see also Philip Zwecker, Laurent Azoulay &
Haim A. Abenhaim, Effect of Fear of Litigation on Obstetric Care: A Nationwide Analysis on
Obstetric Practice, 28 AM. J. PERINATOLOGY 277, 277 (2011) (finding that higher malpractice
premiums are associated with higher incidences of C-sections and lower rates of vaginal births
after C-sections).
110. Yang et al., supra note 22, at 237.
111. Id.
112. Myungho Paik, Bernard Black & David A. Hyman, Damage Caps and Defensive
Medicine, Revisited, 51 J. HEALTH ECON. 84, 84–87 (2017); see also Paul C. Weiler,
Reforming Medical Malpractice in a Radically Moderate—and Ethical—Fashion, 54 DEPAUL
L. REV. 205, 216–19 (2005).
113. See generally MELLO & KACHALIA, supra note 18, at 101–03 (reviewing the available
evidence on tort reforms and concluding that some are effective and some are not); Michelle
M. Mello, Allen Kachalia & David M. Studdert, Medical Liability—Prospects for Federal
Reform, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1806, 1806–08 (2017) (reviewing the same).
114. Daniel Kessler & Mark McClellan, Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine?, 111
Q.J. ECON. 353, 386 (1996).
115. Avraham & Schanzenbach, supra note 16, at 276–78, 284.
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Michelle Mello and Allen Kachalia concluded that tort reforms can reduce some,
though not all, indications of defensive medicine.116
Focusing on the role of tort reform in the provision of obstetric care, Janet Currie
and Bentley MacLeod considered the possibility that fear of malpractice liability
causes obstetricians to perform C-sections at an inappropriately high rate.117
Examining a variety of reforms, they found that noneconomic damages caps increase
the use of C-sections, while joint and several liability reform (which alters how
liability is allocated between the obstetrician and other actors that may contribute to
a medical error) reduces the use of this procedure.118 These results are somewhat
counterintuitive based on conventional wisdom that higher malpractice pressure
induces the provision of more intensive treatments, and they contradict the results
from previous studies. However, Currie and MacLeod explain that if the rate of Csections is excessive—which existing evidence suggests it is 119—not because of
liability but because this procedure is more profitable, then noneconomic damages
caps (which reduce liability) should increase C-section use and joint and several
liability reform (which increases the accountability of providers for their own
actions) should decrease C-section use.120 They find similar evidence that
noneconomic damages caps and joint and several liability reform increase and
decrease, respectively, inductions of labor and complications of labor and
delivery.121
Extending the work of Currie and MacLeod, Frakes analyzed the role of tort
reform in the provision of obstetric care, focusing on C-sections, episiotomies, and
delivery bed days (all of which are measures of treatment intensity).122 Importantly,
he examined obstetric data over a longer time period than Currie and MacLeod,
which allowed him to examine a richer set of legal changes and augment the
empirical analysis.123 He found that noneconomic damages caps reduce the use of

116. MELLO & KACHALIA, supra note 18, at 101–03; see also Anca M. Cotet, The Impact
of Noneconomic Damages Cap on Health Care Delivery in Hospitals, 14 AM. L. & ECON.
REV. 192, 216–17 (2012) (finding that tort reforms can reduce the overall number of surgeries
and hospital admissions). But see Frank A. Sloan & John H. Shadle, Is There Empirical
Evidence for “Defensive Medicine”? A Reassessment, 28 J. HEALTH ECON. 481, 481 (2009)
(finding no effect of tort reforms on Medicare spending).
117. Currie & MacLeod, supra note 16, at 820, 825–26.
118. Id. at 819–26.
119. Ana P. Betrán, Mario Merialdi, Jeremy A. Lauer, Wang Bing-Shun, Jane Thomas,
Paul Van Look & Marsden Wagner, Rates of Caesarean Section: Analysis of Global, Regional
and National Estimates, 21 PAEDIATRIC PERINATAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 98, 101–05 (2007).
120. Currie & MacLeod, supra note 16, at 804–13. This description is consistent with the
practice of “offensive medicine,” which involves an increase in the use of relatively more
profitable procedures when the liability risk associated with those procedures declines. Other
research has found evidence of the practice of offensive medicine in obstetrics and cardiology.
See Avraham & Schanzenbach, supra note 16, at 275 (finding evidence of offensive medicine
in the treatment of heart attack patients); Shurtz, supra note 91, at 338–39 (finding evidence
consistent with offensive medicine in the performance of C-sections).
121. Currie & MacLeod, supra note 16, at 819–26.
122. Michael Frakes, Defensive Medicine and Obstetric Practices, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 457, 459, 462–64 (2012).
123. Id. at 467–71.
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episiotomies and the number of delivery bed days and have no statistically significant
effect on C-sections.124
While the effect of malpractice liability on the provision of healthcare has
garnered substantial attention over the past thirty years, this attention has been
overwhelmingly focused on physician-delivered care. Indeed, the few studies to even
consider APRNs and PAs in a malpractice context have focused on either the
propensity of these providers to generate malpractice claims125 or the effect of
malpractice pressure on their location decisions.126 While the evidence demonstrates
that APRNs and PAs generate malpractice claims and respond, at least in where they
choose to practice, to malpractice liability, no prior work has investigated how
malpractice liability interacts with SOP laws to affect the provision of healthcare.
The empirical analysis below fills the gap in the existing evidence, but before delving
into that analysis, the next Section details the legal connections between malpractice
liability and SOP laws for physicians, APRNs, and PAs.
B. Legal Connections Between Providers and Implications for Liability
In general, patients may hold APRNs and PAs liable for malpractice just as they
may hold physicians and other professionals liable.127 However, while physicians are
generally responsible for their own malpractice, the same is not necessarily true for
APRNs and PAs, as patients may use various theories of liability to hold a physician
supervising an APRN or PA liable for an injury involving the APRN or PA.128
Indeed, the number of malpractice claims against APRNs and PAs may be artificially
low because claimants may choose to assert claims against their supervising
physicians under various theories of vicarious and direct liability.129
Four general doctrines are particularly relevant.130 While these doctrines may bear
slightly different names in different states and may be treated slightly differently by
those states, the doctrines discussed here—primarily in the language of the
restatements for ease of exposition—form the core of the legal bases for holding
physicians liable based on the actions of APRNs and PAs. 131 First, under the theory

124. Id. at 471–79.
125. See Douglas M. Brock, Jeffrey G. Nicholson & Roderick S. Hooker, Physician
Assistant and Nurse Practitioner Malpractice Trends, 74 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 613, 615–
622 (2017) (examining the number of malpractice claims paid by or on behalf of PAs, NPs,
and physicians).
126. McMichael, supra note 4, at 749–59.
127. See Brock et al., supra note 125, at 615–622 (detailing the number of claims paid by
or on behalf of NPs and PAs).
128. McMichael et al., supra note 15, at 314–17.
129. Id. at 321–24.
130. See id. at 314–17; see also Thomas R. McLean, Crossing the Quality Chasm:
Autonomous Physician Extenders Will Necessitate a Shift to Enterprise Liability Coverage for
Health Care Delivery, 12 HEALTH MATRIX 239, 264 (2002) (“[T]he medical director of a
physician extender accrues liability either directly for negligent selection and retention of an
incompetent physician extender, or vicariously under the doctrines of respondeat superior or
the principle of ostensible agency.”); id. at 264–70 (discussing the relevant doctrines).
131. States may maintain doctrines that are related to, but not exactly the same as, the
doctrines discussed here. One example is the “captain of the ship” doctrine which allows
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of respondeat superior, a supervising physician may be held liable for the malpractice
of an APRN or PA under her supervision because “[a]n employer [the physician] is
subject to liability for torts committed by employees [the APRN or PA] while acting
within the scope of their employment.”132 Here, an employee “is an agent whose
principal controls or has the right to control the manner and means of the agent’s
performance of work.”133 And “[a]n employee acts within the scope of employment
when performing work assigned by the employer or engaging in a course of conduct
subject to the employer’s control.”134 Thus, an APRN or PA providing healthcare
under the supervision of a physician is essentially the archetypal example of a
situation in which the principal (the physician) may be held liable for the tort
(malpractice) of the agent (the APRN or PA).
Second, under a theory of apparent agency, a patient may hold a supervising
physician liable for the malpractice of an APRN or PA under her supervision if the
physician’s “manifestations” caused the patient to reasonably believe that the APRN
or PA was acting on the physician’s behalf.135 In other words, if the patient believes
(as a result of some action taken or not taken by the physician) that the APRN or PA
was acting on the physician’s behalf, the patient may extend liability for the acts of
the APRN or PA to the physician.
Third and fourth, the related doctrines of negligent hiring and negligent
supervision may allow patients to hold physicians directly, as opposed to vicariously,
liable. Under these doctrines, it is not the malpractice of the APRN or PA that results
in the physician’s liability but the physician’s direct failure in hiring or supervising
the APRN or PA.136 For example, if a physician is responsible for supervising an
APRN, and the latter causes harm to a patient because she lacked the appropriate
training to provide a healthcare service safely, the physician may be held liable for
negligent supervision.
In general, restrictive SOP laws that require physician supervision of APRNs and
PAs may facilitate the use of these (and related) theories in holding physicians liable
for medical errors involving APRNs and PAs in two distinct ways. First, restrictive
SOP laws may directly aid patients in holding physicians liable for errors involving
APRNs and PAs. For example, if a patient was harmed by an APRN in a state that

patients to hold a physician liable for malpractice when other providers were involved in the
injury based on the physician’s status as the “captain of the ship” (i.e., the provider in overall
control of the situation). See, e.g., Ochoa v. Vered, 212 P.3d 963, 966–67 (Colo. App. 2009)
(discussing the captain of the ship doctrine). The purpose of the discussion here is to provide
the general legal basis for holding a physician liable based on the contents of a state’s SOP
laws. An exhaustive review of all of the variations of the doctrines that may allow a patient to
hold a physician liable based on the involvement of an APRN or PA is well beyond the scope
of this discussion.
132. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
133. Id. § 7.07(3)(a).
134. Id. § 7.07(2).
135. Id. § 7.08; see also id. § 2.03.
136. While “supervision” accounts for most of what may create liability, a physician may
be liable for the harm caused by an APRN or PA if it was caused by the physician’s
“negligence in selecting, training, retaining, supervising, or otherwise controlling the” APRN
or PA. Id. § 7.05(1).
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requires physician supervision of APRNs, that patient will find it relatively easy to
show that the physician “controlled” or had the “right to control” the APRN in
providing healthcare—a necessary element under respondeat superior—since a state
statute explicitly provides that right to control and may even require that the
physician and APRN reduce that right to control to writing in the form of a
supervision agreement. Similarly, patients may find it easier to show that a physician
was negligent in supervising a PA when state law requires that the physician be
onsite when the PA is providing care.
Next, restrictive SOP laws may indirectly aid patients in holding physicians
liable. For example, even if a patient chooses not to (or is unable to for some reason)
rely on a statute requiring physician supervision of APRNs to establish the elements
under respondeat superior, the fact that such a statute exists necessarily means that
APRNs will be more likely to enter into practice arrangements that satisfy the
requirements of this doctrine. Similarly, restrictive SOP laws can force APRNs and
PAs into practice arrangements that necessarily involve a physician hiring and
supervising them, thereby facilitating claims of negligent hiring and supervision.
Prior empirical research has found evidence that SOP laws directly impact the
malpractice claims filed against physicians.137 Examining a national dataset of
malpractice claims filed against physicians, Benjamin McMichael, Barbara Safriet,
and Peter Buerhaus found that the number of claims asserted against physicians
decline as NPs gain more autonomy.138 This is consistent with patients holding
physicians liable (vicariously or directly) for harms involving NPs under their
supervision and suggests that relaxing supervision requirements for APRNs erodes
the ability of injured patients to hold physicians liable.
To be clear, while the evidence demonstrates that restrictive SOP laws facilitate
the ability of patients to hold physicians liable, laws requiring physician supervision
are neither necessary, nor sufficient, to establish any of the theories of liability
discussed here. Whether a physician can be held liable ultimately depends on the
facts of a case, and while restrictive SOP laws can facilitate—directly or indirectly
as discussed above—physician liability, the facts of a particular case may not lend
themselves to physician liability even though a restrictive SOP law is in place.139
Conversely, the facts may lend themselves to physician liability even in the absence
of a restrictive SOP law. Additionally, states may differ in their willingness to apply
certain doctrines to the physician-APRN and physician-PA relationships, though the
courts that have reached this question have generally held that APRNs and PAs
function as the agents of their supervising physicians, thus allowing injured patients
to pursue vicarious liability claims against those physicians. 140

137. McMichael et al., supra note 15, at 323–24.
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., Petzel v. Valley Orthopedics Ltd., 770 N.W.2d 787, 792–94 (Wis. Ct. App.
2009) (holding that summary judgment on physician’s liability was inappropriate based on
factual questions surrounding a PA’s involvement).
140. See, e.g., Ruggiero v. Miles, 125 A.D.3d 1216, 1216–17 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015)
(holding physician vicariously liable for the negligence of an APRN); Cox v. M.A. Primary
and Urgent Care Clinic, 313 S.W.3d 240, 253–54 (Tenn. 2010) (noting that “a physician
assistant stands in an agency relationship with his or her supervising physician” and holding
that, therefore, the physician “could be found vicariously liable for [the PA’s] negligence”).
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Though restrictive SOP laws do not guarantee that a patient may hold a physician
(directly or vicariously) liable when an APRN or PA was involved in causing harm
to that patient, such laws certainly facilitate this liability.141 State laws that mandate
more physician involvement in the practices of APRNs and PAs necessarily ease
plaintiffs’ burdens under all the theories outlined above, as pointing to a state statute
mandating some level of supervision generally makes the supervision element of a
vicarious liability claim (or negligent supervision/hiring claim) easier to prove.142
By easing the burden of holding physicians liable, restrictive SOP laws effectively
shift liability away from APRNs and PAs to physicians.143 This shifting of liability
has the effect of raising the expected costs of liability for physicians and
commensurately lowering these costs for APRNs and PAs. 144 Thus, all else equal,

But see TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 157.060 (West Supp. 2018) (“Unless the physician has reason
to believe the physician assistant or advanced practice registered nurse lacked the competency
to perform the act, a physician is not liable for an act of a physician assistant or advanced
practice registered nurse solely because the physician signed a standing medical order, a
standing delegation order, or another order or protocol, or entered into a prescriptive authority
agreement . . . .”).
141. CAROLYN BUPPERT, NURSE PRACTITIONER’S BUSINESS PRACTICE AND LEGAL GUIDE
268 (4th ed. 2012) (“[I]f a physician is required, by policy or law, to supervise, then a
physician has the responsibility of supervisors in general.”).
142. Id. at 267 (“[P]hysicians cannot expect to be fully free from threat of lawsuit for the
acts of the [APRNs] they collaborate with or supervise until the legal requirements for
collaboration are lifted.”).
143. Two additional details are worth noting. First, with respect to APRNs, some states
require that APRNs “collaborate” with physicians (instead of that they be “supervised” by
physicians). Compare N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6902 (McKinney 2016) (referring to a
“collaborating physician”), with TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-7-126 (2017) (referring to physician
“supervision”). In addition to making little difference in terms of actual physician involvement
in an APRN’s practice, the terms “collaborate” and “supervise” are functionally equivalent
for the purposes of liability. See, e.g., Ruggiero, 125 A.D.3d at 1216–17 (holding that a
physician, despite the use of “collaborate” instead of “supervise” in the state statute, had the
right to control the actions of the APRN and that, accordingly, he could be held vicariously
liable for the APRN’s malpractice). Second, with respect to PAs, all states require that
physicians supervise PAs. McMichael, supra note 4, at 735–36. While these requirements will
generally ease patients’ burdens in holding physicians liable, more restrictive supervision
requirements will nonetheless further ease those burdens. In general, however, the marginal
difference between different classes of physician supervision laws for PAs in terms of the ease
with which a physician can be held liable will be smaller than the marginal difference between
classes for APRNs.
144. The liability shifting discussed here may be undermined by the availability of other
legal doctrines. Depending on the facts of the case and the specific legal theory or theories
employed, the physician may be able to pursue the APRN or PA involved in the injury for
indemnification or contribution—subrogation rights may also become relevant. While the
possibility that these (or other) doctrines may impact the ways in which liability costs are
shifted among different types of providers is worth noting, there are good reasons to believe
that the availability of these legal avenues will not dramatically impact the liability shifting
discussed here. First, the majority of malpractice claims are resolved via settlement, which
may undermine the ability of physicians to pursue indemnification or contribution claims
against APRNs and PAs. See Benjamin J. McMichael, R. Lawrence Van Horn & W. Kip
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physicians face higher malpractice pressure when state law requires them to
supervise or collaborate with APRNs and PAs, while APRNs and PAs face lower
malpractice pressure. This connection between malpractice liability and SOP laws
and its ability to shift liability among providers has the potential to substantially
impact how providers deliver healthcare, particularly since both legal regimes have
been shown to independently impact healthcare delivery.145 The next Part explores
this connection and its potential impact in more detail.
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
To test whether the legal connections between SOP laws and malpractice liability
have a direct impact on the provision of healthcare, I conduct the first empirical
analysis of the joint effect of these legal regimes. Examining the role of these regimes
in healthcare necessarily involves analyzing clinical outcomes, and I focus on
obstetric care throughout the analysis, specifically, the method of delivery employed
at birth. This healthcare outcome has been analyzed by prior work,146 meaning there
exists a useful point of comparison for the results reported here.
Before delving into the details of the empirical analysis, it is important to note
that the question of whether physicians, APRNs, and PAs practice defensive
medicine is beyond the scope of this Article. While interesting, analyzing this
question is of secondary concern to the broader questions of whether and to what
extent tort law deters providers and whether it interacts with SOP laws. Additionally,
as Frakes and Jena note,147 examining whether providers practice defensively
involves nuanced considerations that are difficult to appreciate without an
understanding of how tort law exerts influence on those providers generally. This
Article focuses on the broader question of tort law’s effect on providers and leaves
the more specific question of defensive medicine to future work.
This Part begins with an overview of the medical context in which the analysis
occurs and the dataset I examine. It then engages with the existing literature and the
legal regimes mentioned above to form hypotheses about how changes to those
regimes may impact the provision of healthcare. Most importantly, it describes the

Viscusi, “Sorry” Is Never Enough: How State Apology Laws Fail to Reduce Medical
Malpractice Liability Risk, 71 STAN. L. REV. 341, 367 (2019) (providing evidence that most
malpractice claims are resolved without verdicts). Second, indemnity claims are rarely
pursued even when available. Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden and Fundamental Issue of
Employer Vicarious Liability, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1739, 1753, 1764–67 (1996) (discussing the
rarity of indemnification claims). Third, prior work has noted that subrogation rights, even
when they are legally available, may be difficult to assert and may, therefore, be rarely used.
See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Subrogation and the Theory of Insurance When
Suits Can Be Brought for Losses Suffered, 34 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 619, 636–38 (2018)
(discussing the legal restrictions on subrogation and general ignorance of the availability of
subrogation); see also Kenneth S. Reinker & David Rosenberg, Unlimited Subrogation:
Improving Medical Malpractice Liability by Allowing Insurers to Take Charge, 36 J. LEGAL
STUD. S261, S261–67 (2007) (offering a proposal to address important limitations of
subrogation).
145. See Markowitz et al., supra note 10, at 216; Yang et al., supra note 22, at 240–41.
146. E.g., Currie & MacLeod, supra note 16, at 819–26.
147. Frakes & Jena, supra note 18, at 157–58.
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empirical analysis and discusses the results of that analysis. The Technical Appendix
discusses the econometric details of the analysis as well as supplementary analyses
and results.148
A. Data and Medical Context
While SOP laws and malpractice liability can impact a wide range of healthcare
services, it is not feasible to examine the entire healthcare system at once.
Accordingly, I limit my analysis to a single context—obstetric care. Obstetric care
is a critically important area of healthcare and one which suffers from problems that
have substantial implications for patients. For example, among developed countries,
the United States has the highest maternal mortality rate, and, as maternal mortality
rates continue to decline across much of the world, they have increased in the United
States.149 In fact, childbirth is more likely to kill the mother today than a quarter
century ago.150 While many reasons may help to explain this problematic trend, the
provision of unnecessarily intensive treatments may factor into high maternal
mortality rates.151 Indeed, in the United States, 32% of infants are delivered via Csection.152 The World Health Organization (WHO), following a systematic review
of the available evidence, “concluded that at population level, [C-section] rates
higher than 10% were not associated with reductions in maternal and newborn
mortality rates.”153 While C-sections can improve outcomes and save lives, at current
rates, they can pose significant risks to mothers and infants and are often performed
for nonmedical reasons.154
Beyond the importance of obstetric care in and of itself, it is uniquely well suited
to an empirical analysis of the joint effect of SOP laws and malpractice liability for
several reasons. First, obstetric care can be provided by physicians, APRNs
(particularly CNMs), and PAs, meaning that changes to the SOP laws governing

148. Technical Appendix, supra note 31.
149. See Nicholas J. Kassebaum, Caitlyn Steiner, Christopher J. L. Murray, Alan D. Lopez
& Rafael Lozano, GBD 2015 MATERNAL MORTALITY COLLABORATORS, Global, Regional,
and National Levels of Maternal Mortality, 1990–2015: A Systematic Analysis for the Global
Burden of Disease Study 2015, 388 LANCET 1775, 1775–77 (2016) (reviewing maternal
mortality across the world and placing U.S. rates in context); see also Marian F. MacDorman,
Eugene Declercq, Howard Cabral & Christine Morton, Is the United States Maternal Mortality
Rate Increasing? Disentangling Trends from Measurement Issues, 128 OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 447, 447 (2016) (“[T]he estimated maternal mortality rate for 48 states and
Washington, DC, increased from 2000 to 2014; the international trend was in the opposite
direction.”).
150. Ritsema & Klingler, supra note 48, at 11.
151. Elizabeth Heubeck, Midwives Could Be Key to Reversing Maternal Mortality Trends,
CONN. HEALTH I-TEAM (Oct. 30, 2018), http://c-hit.org/2018/10/30/midwives-could-be-keyto-reversing-maternal-mortality-trends/ [https://perma.cc/4YB4-VBCA].
152. See Technical Appendix, supra note 31, at A18.
153. Betrán et al., supra note 25, at 667.
154. Ties Boerma et al., Global Epidemiology of Use of and Disparities in
Caesarean Sections, 392 LANCET 1341, 1341 (2018) (“[T]he large increase in [C-section] use,
often for non-medical indications, is of concern given the risks for both women and
children.”).
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these providers will impact the delivery of obstetric care.155 Second, providers are
sensitive to malpractice pressure when providing obstetric care, meaning that
changes in malpractice pressure should impact how these providers practice.156
Because both legal regimes can impact the provision of obstetric care, it is a useful
context in which to begin searching for a joint effect of these two regimes.
Third, the treatment choices for laboring mothers allow for some discretion on
the part of the provider (in consultation with the patient). The presence of “gray
areas” in which providers could legitimately choose either the more intensive or less
intensive treatment option means that it is possible to observe some marginal changes
in treatment choices in response to changes in SOP laws and malpractice pressure.
Fourth, as described in detail below, it is possible to obtain information on nearly
every birth in the United States. Including every instance of a particular type of care
in an empirical analysis eliminates concerns about the possibility of biased samples
and other potential problems that can occur when only a subset of information is
included in the analysis.
The focus of my analysis is the choice of delivery procedure.157 I also consider
the role of access to care by examining the rate at which CNMs attend births.158 To
obtain information on obstetric care, I rely on the National Vital Statistics System
(NVSS). Each infant born alive in the United States is issued a certificate of live birth
by the state in which the birth occurred.159 Each state then cooperates with the NVSS,
which is maintained by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and
the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS), to compile a complete dataset of
all births within the United States each year.160 I analyze the restricted version of this
dataset pursuant to a data use agreement with the NCHS. This is the same dataset
used by Currie and MacLeod, the Yang group, and the Markowitz group, so the
results presented here are comparable to their results. However, while they each
limited their analyses to a sample of the dataset—10%, 5%, and 25%, respectively—
I analyze the entire dataset, which contains all births between 1998 and 2015—over
69 million in total.161
In the NVSS dataset, I observe a variety of information about each birth, including
whether a physician or CNM attended the birth.162 Among the information

155. See Markowitz et al., supra note 10, at 209–16 (finding statistically significant effects
of SOP laws on the provision of obstetric care).
156. See Yang et al., supra note 22, at 234 (finding statistically significant effects of
malpractice pressure on the provision of obstetric care).
157. While maternal mortality is obviously important as well, the dataset I examine does
not include information on mortality. Future work should investigate the effect of SOP laws
and malpractice pressure on mortality in more depth.
158. Heubeck, supra note 151 (explaining the importance of access to CNMs).
159. National Vital Statistics System: Birth Data, CDC: NAT’L CTR FOR HEALTH STAT.
(Nov. 27, 2019), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/births.htm [https://perma.cc/6NZS-6676].
160. Id.
161. Currie & MacLeod, supra note 16, at 815; Markowitz et al., supra note 10, at 207;
Yang et al., supra note 22, at 224.
162. As noted by the Markowitz group, the provider listed as the attendant at birth on the
birth certificate is not always a perfect representation of which provider actually cared for the
mother during labor. Markowitz et al., supra note 10, at 206, 208. Data drawn from birth
certificates generally undercounts the number of births attended by CNMs. Id. While these
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concerning delivery method contained in the dataset, I focus on indicators for
whether the infant was delivered vaginally, whether the infant was delivered via Csection, whether the infant was delivered vaginally after the mother had previously
received a C-section, and whether labor was medically induced. Vaginal births
represent the lowest level of treatment intensity, as they can involve little to no
medical intervention. C-section births represent the highest level of intensity since
they involve “a surgical procedure used to deliver a baby through incisions in the
abdomen and uterus.”163 Medical induction of labor represents an intermediate level
of intensity between the two, as it involves a specific medical intervention but not a
surgical procedure.164 C-sections can follow attempted vaginal deliveries and
medical inductions of labor, and when this occurs, I define that birth as occurring via
C-section. I also separately consider vaginal births after previous C-sections
(VBACs) because having a prior C-section reduces the provider’s discretion in
performing a vaginal delivery in subsequent births. Thus, SOP laws and malpractice
pressure may affect VBAC rates differently from other birth outcomes.
In addition to these general outcomes, I collect information to determine whether
a birth was “high risk,” consistent with the approach of Currie and MacLeod.165
High-risk births are those in which the mother suffers from a condition which would
limit providers’ discretion regarding the most appropriate method of delivery.166 I
also collect information that allows me to identify, consistent with the Markowitz
study, whether a C-section or induction was apparently “elective.”167 A procedure is
elective if, based on the information provided on the birth certificate, there are no
clinical characteristics that favor greater medical intervention.168 While the primary
focus of the analysis is on C-sections generally, considering delivery methods in
different contexts (e.g., high-risk and low-risk) is important because providers have
differing degrees of discretion to choose different delivery procedures in these
contexts.

issues do not make the information on attendants useless, the results from the analysis of
whether a CNM attended a birth should be interpreted with these limitations in mind.
163. C-section, MAYO CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/c-section/abo
ut/pac-20393655 [https://perma.cc/67VP-WU69].
164. Labor Induction, MAYO CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/laborinduction/about/pac-20385141 [https://perma.cc/6EZT-QX64].
165. Currie & MacLeod, supra note 16, at 814.
166. If the mother suffers from any of the following conditions, Currie and MacLeod
define the birth as high-risk: “anemia, cardiac or lung conditions, diabetes, herpes, eclampsia,
incompetent cervix, previous large or preterm deliveries, renal failure, rh problems, or uterine
bleeding or other medical risk factors.” Id. I identify all of these conditions using the NVSS
data and create an indicator variable for high-risk pregnancy based on the presence of one or
more of these factors. While the information available on birth certificates changed in 2003,
it is still possible to identify high-risk births across the entire dataset.
167. Markowitz et al., supra note 10, at 206.
168. A labor induction is elective if any of the following characteristics are present: “1)
premature rupture of membranes and 2) chorioamnionitis (inﬂammation of the fetal
membranes due to bacterial infection) or evidence of chorioamnionitis as indicated by the
presence of intrapartum fever.” A C-section is elective if 1 and 2 are present and there is “3)
presentation other than cephalic (any part of the fetus other than the head appearing ﬁrst) and
4) fetal distress or fetal intolerance of labor.” Id.
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Next, I collect information on a series of pregnancy and infant health outcomes,
including the length of gestation, birth weight, the five-minute Apgar score,169 and
whether the infant suffered a birth injury. All of these outcomes are indicative of
infant or maternal health.170 While these outcomes are certainly important, I examine
them primarily as a means to test whether any observed changes in how providers
deliver care translate into positive or negative outcomes for patients. Accordingly,
much of this analysis is provided in the Technical Appendix.171
Finally, I collect demographic and medical information about the mother and
infant from the data provided in each birth certificate. Specifically, I gather
information on the mother’s age, education level, race, and marital status at the time
of birth. I also obtain information on the sex of the infant and the number of infants
born during a single birth episode. I use this demographic and medical information
to construct control variables in my analysis since all of these factors can influence
the method of delivery.
In addition to all of the other information provided in the NVSS dataset, each
observation includes the state where the delivery occurred—this information is only
available in the restricted-use files which require NCHS permission to access. Based
on this state information, I assign an SOP law to each birth. As described above, I
assign each state in each year to either the “APRN Independence” or “Restricted
Practice” category, depending on the APRN SOP laws in place in a particular year,
and to either the “PA Autonomy” or “Limited Practice” category, depending on the
PA SOP laws in place.
Measuring the malpractice pressure faced by individual providers is somewhat
more difficult than measuring SOP laws. One way that prior work has examined the
role of malpractice pressure is to consider the effect of tort reforms on various
outcomes.172 However, while tort reforms may represent clear shifts in the liability
risk faced by providers, they may not fully capture all of the factors that influence
the malpractice risks providers must confront. Therefore, I follow the lead of the
Yang group and measure malpractice liability risk using the malpractice premiums
paid by physicians since these premiums reflect the various influences on
malpractice risk.173 Information on premiums comes from a series of surveys of

169. Apgar Score, MEDLINE PLUS (Jan. 6, 2020), https://medlineplus.gov/ency/article/003
402.htm [https://perma.cc/D4YF-HBTN] (“Apgar is a quick test performed on a baby at 1 and
5 minutes after birth. The 1-minute score determines how well the baby tolerated the birthing
process. The 5-minute score tells the health care provider how well the baby is doing outside
the mother's womb.”).
170. See generally Am. C. Obstetrics & Gynecology, Committee Opinion No 579:
Definition of Term Pregnancy, 122 OBSTETRICS GYNECOLOGY 1139, 1139–40 (2013); Douglas
Almond, Kenneth Y. Chay & David S. Lee, The Costs of Low Birth Weight, 120 Q.J. ECON.
1031, 1031–36 (2005).
171. Technical Appendix, supra note 31.
172. See, e.g., Avraham & Schanzenbach, supra note 16, at 273 (examining the role of tort
reform in the provision of cardiac care).
173. Yang et al., supra note 22, at 222, 226–27.
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malpractice insurers conducted by the Medical Liability Monitor (MLM), a trade
publication among malpractice insurers.174
In the early 1990s, the MLM began surveying malpractice insurers about the rates
they charged physicians in different parts of the country.175 The information obtained
through these surveys represents the only source of national, longitudinal data on
malpractice insurance premiums.176 In each year, the MLM surveyed malpractice
insurers in each state and obtained information on the premiums charged to
physicians in three specialties: general surgery, internal medicine, and
obstetrics/gynecology.177 Beginning with the raw survey responses, several
researchers led by Bernard Black cleaned the data to produce uniform information
on the malpractice premiums charged to the three specialties from the early 1990s
through 2016.178 As a measure of malpractice pressure, I rely on the (weighted)
average premium charged at the state level as calculated by the Black group.
Throughout my analysis, I use the state-level information on malpractice premiums
because the researchers who cleaned the data acknowledge some reporting issues at
the substate level and because the data use agreement that allows me to analyze the
NVSS dataset does not permit matching malpractice premium information below the
state level.179
At the state level, the Black team provides the average premium charged to
different specialties for several different types of policies.180 To maintain
consistency, I concentrate on the premiums charged for a single insurance policy
type: $1 million/$3 million claims-made policies. This type of policy provides
coverage for individual incidents up to $1 million, with an overall cap of $3 million
(over multiple incidents) for the policy period. By limiting my analysis to a single
type of policy, I standardize the measure of malpractice pressure and avoid the
problem that a state or year may appear to have higher malpractice pressure simply
because I measure that pressure with the premium for a different type of policy.
While $1 million/$3 million claims-made policies are, by far, the most common type
of policy, the MLM dataset lacks information on this type of policy for several states
in several years of my study period.181 To address this problem, I use multiple
imputation methods to impute the premiums charged when they are missing.182

174. See Rate Survey, MED. LIABILITY MONITOR, https://medicalliabilitymonitor.com/ratesurvey/ [https://perma.cc/YCB9-TDLH] (discussing the MLM’s rate survey).
175. Bernard Black, Jeanette W. Chung, Jeffrey Traczynski, Victoria Udalova & Sonal
Vats, Medical Liability Insurance Premia: 1990–2016 Dataset, with Literature Review and
Summary Information, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 238, 238 (2017).
176. Id. at 238.
177. Id. at 239.
178. Id. at 239–41.
179. See id. at 242.
180. Bernard Black, Jeanette W. Chung, Jeffrey Traczynski, Victoria Udalova & Sonal
Vats, Medical Liability Insurance Premia 1990-2015: Dataset, with Literature Review, and
Summary Information 1–5 (NW. L. & Econ. Research Paper 16-04), https://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2477120 [https://perma.cc/8NFT-5KU3].
181. Id. at 5–6.
182. Specifically, I impute missing data using a linear regression with the following set of
demographic variables (defined at the state level): unemployment rate, average income,
percentage female, percentage white, percentage black, percentage Hispanic, percentage with
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However, estimating the models reported below with the states missing premium
data excluded from the analysis leads to little change in the results.
Throughout the analysis, I use the malpractice premiums paid by general surgeons
as the measure of malpractice pressure. While the MLM dataset includes premium
information for obstetricians/gynecologists, using these premiums may induce bias
in the results. Specifically, SOP laws can affect the ability of patients to hold
physicians liable, which can affect the number and size of malpractice claims against
physicians. This can, in turn, impact the malpractice premiums paid by physicians.183
Moreover, the treatment patterns of obstetric providers themselves may influence
obstetrician/gynecologist premiums, potentially introducing additional bias.184 To
address each of these concerns, I follow the approach of Beomsoo Kim who, when
analyzing the impact of malpractice pressure on obstetricians, measured that pressure
by focusing on other specialties.185 In particular, the premiums paid by general
surgeons are not sensitive to state SOP laws because APRNs and PAs cannot practice
general surgery alone and will, therefore, always be supervised by surgeons when
practicing in that context. Thus, in the surgery context, changes in SOP laws will not
meaningfully shift liability among APRNs, PAs, and physicians. 186 Additionally,
changes in obstetric practices will not impact the premiums paid by general surgeons,
making these premiums the best available measure for the malpractice pressure faced
by obstetric providers.187
Using the data on malpractice premiums paid by general surgeons, I classify states
into quartiles based on the average malpractice premium charged in each year, and I
use a series of indicator variables for these quartiles throughout my analysis. Thus,
each state in each year may be categorized into one of four quartiles, with the first
quartile having the lowest level of malpractice pressure and the fourth quartile having

less than a high school education, percentage with a high school education, percentage with
some college education, and percentage with a college education. I also include a series of
indicators for the following tort reforms: noneconomic damages caps, punitive damages caps,
collateral source rule reform, and joint and several liability reform.
183. McMichael et al., supra note 15, at 323–24.
184. Kim, supra note 89, at S84 (“One challenge for reliable identification is that
malpractice risk as defined [by a measure of risk specific to obstetrics] may be correlated with
other factors related to the treatment decision, such as unobserved patient characteristics,
physician quality, or practice style.”).
185. Id. (“In particular, I use the malpractice risk for specialties other than ob-gyn as an
instrument for the ob-gyn risk measure.”).
186. This is not to suggest that APRNs and PAs do not practice alongside general surgeons.
187. In the interest of completeness, I have estimated all of the models reported below
using the premiums paid by obstetrician/gynecologists instead of those paid by general
surgeons. While these models suffer from the problems outlined above, I nonetheless
estimated them to ensure that the point estimates do not change wildly. In general, the point
estimates change somewhat, but the overall results are the same.
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the highest.188 This approach avoids imposing any assumptions of strict linearity on
the effect of malpractice pressure.189
The final dataset I examine includes over 69 million observations of individual
births between 1998 and 2015.190 Each observation includes the method of delivery,
medical and demographic information about the mother and infant, and the nature of
the delivery (e.g., high risk). Based on the state where the birth occurred, each
observation is linked to an SOP law for APRNs, an SOP law for PAs, and a
malpractice pressure quartile as defined above. With this information available for
over 69 million births, the dataset analyzed here represents one of the richest sources
of information on legal regimes and healthcare outcomes available. It is worth noting
that the dataset I examine is essentially the same one used by the CDC in calculating
official U.S. birth statistics.191
Prior to conducting a formal empirical analysis that can reveal the causal effects
of different legal regimes, it is useful to examine the general contours of these
regimes and the healthcare outcomes they may affect. Figure 1 offers a summary of
C-section rates across the country. Panel A reports the percentage of births involving
a C-section in each state in 2015, and Panel B reports the percentage change in Csection rates between 1998 and 2015. In general, C-section rates are higher than
recommended by the WHO in every state, though states in the South and East have
the highest rates. Similarly, C-section rates increased in every state between 1998
and 2015, but there is no obvious regional pattern in this increase.

188. I have also estimated all of the models reported below using deciles (i.e., ten
individual groupings of states) instead of quartiles with little change in the overall results.
189. It also reduces the concern that inaccurately imputed data could be driving the results
since the imputations would have to be so erroneous as to move a state from one quartile to
another.
190. I limit my analysis to 1998–2015 for two reasons. First, prior work has identified
some issues with respect to the malpractice premium data used here in the early 1990s. Black
et al., supra note 175, at 242. Second, prior to 1998, Medicare did not directly reimburse
APRNs and PAs for their services, instead paying them only for services provided incident to
physician services—most private insurers maintained similar restrictions. Following the
passage of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Medicare (and many private insurers) began
directly reimbursing APRNs and PAs. Michael A. Frakes & Tracylain Evans, An Overview of
Medicare Reimbursement Regulations for Advanced Practice Nurses, 24 NURSING ECON. 59,
59–65 (2006). Prior to this Act, APRNs and PAs were effectively tied to physicians under
federal law, even if state law granted them more autonomy, meaning that the effects of any
state law changes prior to 1998 would be substantially muted.
191. See JOYCE A. MARTIN, BRADY E. HAMILTON & MICHELLE J.K. OSTERMAN, NAT’L CTR.
FOR HEALTH STAT., BIRTHS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2015, 1–5 (2016) (examining the same data
as that examined here when deriving official statistics on births in the United States).
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Figure 1: C-Section Rates by State
Panel A: C-Section Percentages in 2015

Panel B: Percent Change in C-Section Rates Between 1998 and 2015

Figure 2 provides an overview of the medical and legal contexts in which the
primary analysis occurs. Panel A reports the percentage of births each year that
occurred in states that allowed APRNs to practice independently and PAs to practice
autonomously. In general, there has been a marked trend towards relaxing SOP laws
for both APRNs and PAs. In 1998, only about 3% of births occurred in states where
APRNs could practice independently, but this number was approaching 20% by
2015. The trend for PAs is even more striking, with births in states allowing PA
autonomy increasing from about 5% to almost 50% between 1998 and 2015. While
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this pattern of SOP law changes is interesting, it also demonstrates that there has
been substantial variation in SOP laws over time, which is critical for the empirical
models discussed below.
Figure 2: Overview of SOP Laws and Obstetric Outcomes
Panel A: Births and SOP Laws

Panel C: PA SOP Laws and C-Sections

Panel B: APRN SOP Laws and
C-Sections

Panel D: Malpractice Risk and
C-Sections

While C-section rates in the United States have also followed an upward
trajectory, these rates are not equal across states with different SOP laws, as
demonstrated in Panels B and C. States that allow APRNs to practice independently
and states that allow PAs to practice autonomously always have lower C-section
rates, though the difference is greater for APRN SOP laws than PA SOP laws. Csection rates also vary by the amount of malpractice pressure faced by providers, and
Panel D reports the percentage of births resulting in a C-section across the four
quartiles of general surgeon malpractice premiums. While the differences in Csection rates reported in Panels B–D do not establish causal effects of SOP laws or
malpractice pressure, they do suggest that providers respond to differences in the
legal environment. Table A2 in the Technical Appendix reports a full set of summary
statistics for all of the legal and obstetric outcomes of interest across all years of the
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dataset, and Table A3 reports summary statistics across different SOP law
regimes.192
B. Mechanisms of Effect and Expected Impacts of Legal Changes
In general, malpractice pressure and SOP laws may impact the provision of
obstetric care through multiple pathways.193 Beginning with malpractice pressure, I
expect that greater pressure will induce the provision of more intensive care (i.e.,
providers will perform more C-sections, medically induce more patients, and
perform fewer VBACs). While not every study to investigate malpractice liability
and obstetric care has found results consistent with these effects,194 the studies most
similar to the analysis here—those that rely on malpractice premiums as their
measure of malpractice pressure—have found evidence that an increase in
malpractice pressure leads to the provision of more intensive care.195 Though
investigating the practice of defensive medicine is not the focus of my analysis, the
effects identified in prior work and the effects I expect to find here may be consistent
with defensive medicine, as providers perform C-sections primarily to avoid liability
and not for sound medical reasons.196
Kim offers insight into the relationship between malpractice pressure and Csections. She explains that providers generally take a “fetus first” view,197 often
defaulting to C-sections when they have doubts about the propriety of a vaginal
delivery.198 This philosophy may stem from the fact that physicians “are more likely
to be suspected of negligence when the baby is delivered vaginally because of the
limited control of progress compared with c-section[s.]”199 Kim further notes that
“[t]he complaint of failure to deliver by c-section is frequently listed as a reason for
a malpractice claim,”200 which may explain why physicians perform C-sections when
they “ha[ve] any concerns that a vaginal delivery may threaten the health of [the]
infant.”201
Turning to SOP laws, I expect that relaxing the laws governing APRNs and PAs
will induce the provision of less intensive care (i.e., providers will perform fewer Csections, induce labor less often, and perform more VBACs). I also expect that
CNMs will attend more births. In general, APRNs employ a model of care that relies
less on medical technology and intensive treatments than physicians.202 Instead of
relying on these treatments, APRNs tend to spend more time with patients.203 Thus,

192. Technical Appendix, supra note 31.
193. For a full discussion of the existing literature, see supra Section II.A.
194. See, e.g., Currie & MacLeod, supra note 16, at 816–24 (finding different effects).
195. Yang et al., supra note 90, at 237–240; Yang et al., supra note 22, at 236–37.
196. Yang et al., supra note 90, at 237–240.
197. Kim, supra note 89, at S82–83.
198. Ronald M. Cyr, Myth of the Ideal Caesarean Section Rate: Commentary and Historic
Perspective, 194 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 932, 933 (2006).
199. Kim, supra note 89, at S82.
200. Id. at S83.
201. Id.
202. Markowitz et al., supra note 10, at 204.
203. Id.
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to the extent APRNs provide more pre-, peri-, and postnatal care, the use of intensive
procedures should decline. With respect to PAs, their model of care may hew closer
to that of physicians than to APRNs—PAs are trained in the “medical model” similar
to physicians, as opposed to the nursing model of APRNs.204 However, they may still
rely less on medical technology than physicians.205 Moreover, physicians may rely
on PAs instead of medical technology and the use of more intensive treatments,
meaning that as the amount of pre-, peri-, and postnatal care provided by PAs
increases, the use of intensive treatments should decrease.206 In general, PAs may
focus on more medically complex patients than APRNs, so the effect of changes in
PA SOP laws may be more concentrated among these patients than the effects of
changes in APRN SOP laws.
Overall, relaxed SOP laws should result in the provision of more care by APRNs
and PAs and thus a decrease in the rate of intensive treatments (such as C-sections
and inductions of labor). 207 This reduction may stem from three general mechanisms.
First, granting APRNs and PAs more authority and autonomy can increase the
number of these providers, particularly in areas that lack an adequate supply of
physicians.208 This mechanism may manifest as more CNMs attend births relative to
their physician colleagues following the liberalization of APRN SOP laws. Second,
relaxing SOP laws may better enable APRNs and PAs to meet patients’ demand for
their services, especially in isolated areas or settings where physicians have
historically not practiced, because they are not as tightly tethered to physicians.209 In
general, both of these mechanisms directly result in APRNs and PAs providing more
care and therefore lead to the effects described. Finally, a third mechanism may lead
to the effects described above via a change in physician practice patterns. Under less
strict SOP laws, APRNs and PAs can better compete with physicians.210 This
increased competition may induce physicians to practice more like APRNs and PAs
to the extent patients demand the latter’s practice styles (i.e., providing less intensive
treatments).
In changing the provision of care through these mechanisms, relaxed SOP laws
likely operate primarily through CNMs, as these providers are heavily involved in
the provision of obstetric care. However, I include other APRNs (particularly NPs)
and PAs in the analysis because, while they may be less involved in obstetric care

204. Berkowitz & White, supra note 45, at 41.
205. See id. at 40 (explaining that relying on PAs as “laborists” can reduce the need for
technology-heavy interventions such as C-sections and inductions).
206. Id.
207. See Markowitz et al., supra note 10, at 204 (offering a similar discussion of these
effects).
208. McMichael, supra note 4, at 759–64.
209. GILMAN & KOSLOV, supra note 8, at 30 (“APRNs may find it particularly difficult to
[secure physician supervision] in rural or other underserved areas where collaborating
physicians are in short supply.”); see Kleiner et al., supra note 10, at 274–77 (finding that
APRNs are better able to control their own labor output when they can practice
independently). GILMAN & KOSLOV, supra note 8, at 30 (“APRNs may find it particularly
difficult to [secure physician supervision] in rural or other underserved areas where
collaborating physicians are in short supply.”).
210. GILMAN & KOSLOV, supra note 8, at 38–39.
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than CNMs, relaxed SOP laws directly impact their ability to care for patients in
contexts that affect obstetric outcomes. For example, if a women’s health NP can
provide more prenatal care under relaxed SOP laws, this care may obviate the need
for a C-section later.211 Relatedly, if PAs can better care for laboring mothers under
relaxed SOP laws, then physicians may be under less pressure to provide Csections.212
Turning next to the joint effect of SOP laws and malpractice pressure, these two
legal regimes may interact to further affect healthcare beyond the independent effects
of each regime. As APRNs and PAs gain more authority and autonomy with less
restrictive SOP laws, they also bear more malpractice pressure because patients’
ability to hold physicians vicariously or directly liable for medical errors involving
APRNs and PAs is diminished.213 And this may lead to differential effects of relaxing
SOP laws on obstetric care, depending on the malpractice pressure faced by
providers.
In particular, individual APRNs and PAs may make different treatment decisions
when their SOP laws are relaxed depending on whether they face relatively high or
low malpractice pressure. Because their malpractice risk is lower in states that
require physician supervision—and physicians’ malpractice risk is commensurately
higher—APRNs and PAs may not consider the liability implications of their
individual decisions. However, as they gain more autonomy and therefore see an
increase in their malpractice risk—physicians see a commensurate decrease in their
risk—APRNs and PAs may start to more carefully consider the liability implications
of their decisions. Thus, granting APRNs and PAs more autonomy may have
different effects on the decisions they make depending on the malpractice pressure
they face.
Figure 3, which depicts a hypothetical (and representative) CNM, illustrates the
differential effect of relaxing SOP laws across different levels of malpractice
pressure. This CNM initially practices in a state with restrictive SOP laws. Based on
these laws, her malpractice risk is quite low—patients can relatively easily pursue
(direct or vicarious) claims against her supervising physician. Now suppose that the
CNM’s state grants APRNs independence, which both increases the ability of the
CNM to provide care (including less intensive care) and increases her malpractice
liability risk because patients can no longer as easily hold her supervising physician
liable.

211. See Doyle & Silber, supra note 47, at 50–54.
212. Berkowitz & White, supra note 45, at 40.
213. McMichael et al., supra note 15, at 322–24; see supra Section II.B.
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Figure 3: Effect of Malpractice Pressure and Scope-of-Practice Laws Generally

Suppose further that this state is one with low malpractice pressure generally—
represented by the lower (light gray) path in Figure 3. This low level of malpractice
pressure may be the result of tort reforms, a legal culture that generally disfavors
litigation, a healthcare culture that generally encourages dispute resolution outside
of the legal system, or any of myriad other reasons. If the CNM is granted
independence in this type of state, the malpractice pressure she faces will increase
relatively slightly. While patients will find it more difficult to hold her supervising
physician liable after independence, the marginal increase in malpractice pressure
the CNM will experience will not be substantial because her state generally has low
malpractice pressure. Consistent with prior evidence, this newly independent CNM
will recommend C-sections at lower rates, helping to lower the C-section rate
overall.214 Because the malpractice pressure is low in this state, the CNM will not
face substantial pressure to recommend more C-sections in hopes of staving off
malpractice claims. The net effect, therefore, will be a lower C-section rate.
On the other hand, suppose that the state where the CNM practices has high
malpractice pressure—represented by the upper (dark gray) path in Figure 3—which
may be the case for a variety of reasons. If the CNM is granted independence in this
type of state, she will see a substantial jump in her malpractice pressure because,
once their ability to pursue claims against physicians is curtailed, patients will pursue
claims at relatively high rates against CNMs. Thus, the marginal increase in
malpractice pressure faced by the CNM following independence will be substantial.
Accordingly, although this CNM may wish to treat patients less intensively by
recommending fewer C-sections, the malpractice pressure she faces will dissuade
her from doing so. The net effect will be, at minimum, a smaller decrease in the C-

214. Markowitz et al., supra note 10, at 216–17.
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section rate than if the state had low malpractice pressure. Potentially, the C-section
rate may remain unchanged or even increase.
Magnifying these effects, which pertain to a representative CNM, is the potential
for changes in SOP laws to impact the number of providers. Though the evidence is
somewhat mixed, some work suggests that physicians avoid areas with high
malpractice pressure.215 Similarly, more APRNs and PAs work in areas that (1) have
low malpractice pressure and (2) grant them more autonomy.216 Accordingly,
relaxing SOP laws in areas with low malpractice pressure may result in a larger
marginal increase in the supply of APRNs and PAs relative to a similar relaxation of
laws in areas with high malpractice pressure. This would have the effect of
magnifying the impacts discussed above, with C-section rates decreasing even more
in areas with low malpractice pressure and decreasing even less (or increasing) in
areas with high malpractice pressure than would occur absent changes in the supply
of providers.
In general, the interaction of SOP laws and malpractice pressure may have
important effects on the healthcare workforce and, in turn, on the provision of
healthcare. Despite the importance of these factors, no prior work has investigated
how the interaction of SOP laws and malpractice pressure may impact the delivery
of healthcare. This Article fills that gap in the literature by specifically investigating
the impact of these different legal regimes on the provision of obstetric care.
C. Empirical Methodology
The goal of the empirical analysis is to generate evidence on the causal impact of
SOP laws and malpractice pressure on the provision of obstetric care. Establishing a
causal relationship between legal changes and healthcare outcomes—as opposed to
merely an association between the two—is not straightforward. Ideally, I would
conduct a laboratory-type experiment in which some providers would be randomly
assigned to practice under relaxed SOP laws and others would be assigned to practice
under restrictive SOP laws.217 This assignment would further vary so that some
providers practiced subject to high malpractice pressure and others to low
malpractice pressure. This type of random assignment would facilitate a
straightforward statistical analysis that could reveal the causal impacts of these legal
changes on the provision of obstetric care. While such a laboratory-type experiment
is not possible for a variety of ethical, political, legal, and financial reasons, the goal
of my empirical analysis is to mimic such an experiment as closely as possible,

215. See David A. Matsa, Does Malpractice Liability Keep the Doctor Away? Evidence
from Tort Reform Damage Caps, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. S143, S165 (2007) (finding that reducing
malpractice pressure via tort reform does not increase the supply of physicians generally but
does increase the supply of specialist physicians in rural areas).
216. McMichael, supra note 4, at 764–65.
217. See J. Shahar Dillbary, Griffin Edwards & Fredrick E. Vars, Why Exempting
Negligent Doctors May Reduce Suicide: An Empirical Analysis, 93 IND. L.J. 457, 482 (2018)
(referring to a laboratory experiment as the “gold standard”); Michael D. Frakes, The
Surprising Relevance of Medical Malpractice Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 364 (2015)
(discussing idealized laboratory settings when examining the impact of changes in laws).
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eliminating as many potential confounding factors as possible in order to isolate the
effects of the legal regimes under investigation.
One way to achieve this goal is to use what has been called a natural policy
experiment to draw causal inferences about the effect of different legal regimes.
Here, the primary “treatment” under investigation is whether an individual provider
practices under a relaxed or restrictive SOP regime. Further, these regimes are
layered on top of areas with high or low malpractice pressure. Because some states
changed their SOP laws while others did not and because states experienced different
levels of malpractice pressure, “treatment” (states with a particular type of SOP law
or malpractice pressure) and “control” groups are readily available for analysis.
However, while the adoption of new SOP laws at different points in time by different
states, which also experienced different levels of malpractice pressure, offers
convenient “treatment” and “control” groups, the assignment of any given state to
one of these groups is almost certainly not random. Without random assignment to
these groups, the simple statistical comparisons one might see in a laboratory setting
are not sufficient to provide evidence of the causal effects of legal changes on the
provision of healthcare.
Focusing on the effect of APRN SOP laws on C-sections as an example,218 one
straightforward way to examine this effect is to simply compare births in states that
allow APRNs to practice independently with births in states that restrict APRNs’
practices. By doing so, it is possible to calculate differences in the probability that a
particular patient receives a C-section in the two different groups. However, this
calculation does not yield evidence of a causal relationship because individual states
differ along many dimensions beyond their APRN SOP laws (e.g., differences in
myriad other laws and differences in the availability of healthcare or health
insurance). These differences, many of which are hidden in even the best datasets,
would almost certainly confound any attempt to estimate the effect of APRN SOP
laws by simply comparing obstetric outcomes across states. To address these issues,
another way to analyze the impact of APRN SOP laws is to compare obstetric
outcomes within the same state before and after that state changes its SOP law.
Unfortunately, this approach also suffers from problems, as provider treatment
patterns, health care norms, legal norms, and many other factors are almost certainly
changing over time for many different reasons. Even if information on all these
factors were available—and often such information does not exist—disentangling
the impacts of all these factors from the impact of APRN SOP laws on C-sections
would be impossible.
The fundamental issue with both of these approaches is the absence of a valid
control group. Using either approach, there are good reasons to believe that different
factors may systematically affect births occurring both when APRNs can practice
independently and when APRNs are restricted. To address these issues and construct
a valid counterfactual against which to compare the “treatment” group, social
scientists rely on difference-in-differences models. These models involve
undertaking both of the calculations above simultaneously. Specifically, these
models allow for the comparison of trends in C-sections over time across the treated

218. The discussion here is applicable to all of the legal regimes and obstetric outcomes
under investigation. I focus on APRN SOP laws and C-sections solely for ease of explanation.
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and control groups. By doing so, it is possible to account for factors that may
influence C-sections—even if it is impossible to observe the factors themselves—
and thereby isolate the amount of change in C-section rates that is attributable to
APRN independence. In other words, difference-in-differences models “difference
out” all of the unobserved factors that may affect birth outcomes over time and within
individual states, thus isolating the causal effect of APRN independence (or any other
legal regime under investigation).
As a hypothetical example, consider Kentucky and Tennessee. Suppose that
Tennessee passed a law that took effect in 2013 granting APRNs independence,
while Kentucky never passed such a law. Suppose further that the numbers of Csections per 100 births in Kentucky and Tennessee in 2012 were 35 and 50,
respectively. In 2013, these rates each decreased to 25 and 30, respectively. Assume
that, had Tennessee never passed its new SOP law, C-section rates there would have
followed the same trend they followed in Kentucky. Simply comparing Kentucky
and Tennessee in 2013 would suggest that allowing APRNs to practice
independently results in 5 fewer C-sections. Comparing Tennessee to itself before
and after it passed the new law would suggest that APRN independence is associated
with 20 fewer C-sections. However, neither of these calculations isolates the role of
APRN independence in C-section rates. To isolate this effect, calculating a
difference-in-differences is necessary. First, I calculate the differences in C-sections
in both Kentucky (25 – 35 = -10) and Tennessee (30 – 50 = -20) before and after
Tennessee passed its new law. Second, I calculate the difference between the two
differences from step one (i.e. -20 – (-10) = -10) to conclude that APRN
independence reduces C-sections by 10. Because this calculation effectively nets out
the idiosyncratic, unobservable factors unique to Tennessee, as well as factors that
change over time in both states, it isolates the effect of APRN independence on Csection rates.
Extending this approach to examine whether granting APRNs independence has
a differential effect across different levels of malpractice pressure, suppose that
North Carolina also began allowing APRNs to practice independently in 2013 and
that North Carolina experiences higher levels of malpractice pressure than
Tennessee. Assume that C-section rates per 100 births in North Carolina were 40 and
28 in 2012 and 2013, respectively. Repeating the difference-in-differences
calculation for North Carolina, again using Kentucky as the control state, implies
that APRN independence decreases C-sections by 2.219 Comparing this result to the
earlier result—a decrease of 10—implies that, while granting APRNs independence
always results in lower C-section rates, the size of this decrease is larger in states
with low malpractice pressure than states with high malpractice pressure.
While this straightforward example focusing on APRN independence, two levels
of malpractice pressure, and C-section rates captures the essence of my empirical
approach, the actual empirical models are substantially more complex. These models
exploit the staggered adoption of changes in both APRN and PA SOP laws across

219. First, I calculate the differences in C-section rates in Kentucky (25 – 35 = –10) and
North Carolina (28 – 40 = –12) before and after North Carolina passed its new law. Second, I
calculate the differences from step one (–12 – (–10) = –2) to conclude that APRN
independence decreases C-section rates by 2.
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four different levels of malpractice pressure. And they extend to outcomes beyond
C-sections. With over sixty-nine million observations included in the primary
models, they take advantage of a rich set of information to arrive at robust estimates
of the roles that SOP laws and malpractice pressure play in obstetric outcomes.
Throughout the analysis, I estimate ordinary least squares (OLS) regression
models. Complete technical details on these models, including the full econometric
specification, are provided in the Technical Appendix.220 The dependent variable in
each model is an indicator variable that equals one when a specified outcome occurs
and zero otherwise. The mean of an indicator variable is an estimate of the
probability with which the relevant outcome occurs.221 For example, an indicator
variable for C-sections equals one when a C-section is performed in a given birth.
Among 200 births, 60 of which involved a C-section, the mean of the relevant
indicator would be 0.3,222 implying a C-section rate of 30%. Because regression
models estimate the change in the conditional mean of the dependent variable
attributable to different independent variables, the models I estimate can provide
estimates of the change in the probability of a given outcome occurring attributable
to different independent variables.
Across multiple models, I examine several different outcomes. First, when
examining C-sections, the dependent variable in each model is an indicator for
whether a C-section was performed. The primary model focuses on all births and Csections. Subsequent models maintain the same dependent variable but are limited
to low-risk births and high-risk births. I also separately examine elective C-sections
and VBACs, and in those models, the dependent variable is an indicator for whether
an elective C-section or VBAC was performed, respectively. Second, when
examining inductions, the primary models include as the dependent variable an
indicator for whether labor was medically induced. Subsequent models include an
indicator for whether an elective induction was performed. Finally, to examine the
effect of APRN SOP laws on the rate at which CNMs attend births, I estimate models
that include an indicator for whether a CNM was the provider responsible for the
birth as the dependent variable.223
Throughout the analysis, I estimate linear probability models (LPM).224 In each
model focusing on APRN SOP laws and malpractice pressure, I include an indicator

220. McMichael, supra note 31.
221. See Currie & MacLeod, supra note 16, at 818, 821 (interpreting the results of models
with indicator variables as the dependent variables as changes in probabilities); McMichael et
al., supra note 144, at 372–75 (making the same interpretation).
(

× ) (

× )

222. Here, the mean is:
= 0.3.
223. Because PA laws do not directly impact the ability of CNMs to attend births, I limit
my analysis of CNM-attended births to consider only APRN SOP laws.
224. LPMs are OLS regression models that include an indicator as the dependent variable.
I estimate LPMs instead of nonlinear models, such as probit and logit models, in my analysis
because this analysis focuses on the interaction between indicator variables. As prior work has
noted, interpreting interaction terms in nonlinear models is not straightforward. Chunrong Ai
& Edward C. Norton, Interaction Terms in Logit and Probit Models, 80 ECON. LETTERS 123,
123–30 (2003). Prior work focusing on similar outcomes has likewise employed LPMs instead
of nonlinear models. Markowitz et al., supra note 10, at 207; Currie & MacLeod, supra note
16, at 818.
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variable for whether a birth took place in a state and year in which APRNs were
allowed to practice independently, separate indicator variables for different levels of
malpractice pressure, and an interaction between the APRN independence indicator
variable and the malpractice pressure indicators. When focusing on PA SOP laws
and malpractice pressure, an indicator for PA autonomy replaces the indicator for
APRN independence.
Because the primary models involve multiple indicator variables and interactions
between them, I report the primary results graphically to facilitate interpretation.
Specifically, after estimating the regression models, I use the estimated coefficients
to calculate the effect of APRN independence (or PA autonomy) across different
levels of malpractice pressure. In all cases, I use states with restrictive SOP laws—
restricted practice for APRNs and limited practice for PAs—and the lowest levels of
malpractice pressure as the baseline case. The effects of liberalizing SOP laws across
different levels of malpractice pressure are then reported as differences from this
baseline. Complete details on these calculations are provided in the Technical
Appendix along with complete regression results.225
In addition to the independent variables of interest, each model includes a series
of variables to control for factors that may affect the decision of how to deliver the
infant. Because the mother’s age can influence delivery method, I include a series of
indicator variables for the mother’s age in five-year increments from fifteen to fifty.
I also include a series of indicators for the mother’s race (African American or black,
Asian, Native American, and Hispanic with white as the omitted category) and
education level (unknown education level, less than high school, high school, some
college, and college with more than college as the omitted category). Finally, I
include an indicator for whether the infant is female and a series of indicators for
multiple births. Collectively, these variables control for demographic and medical
factors that prior work has shown can influence obstetric outcomes, thereby better
allowing the models to isolate the impact of SOP laws and malpractice pressure from
these other factors.226 Importantly, all of the models include indicator variables for
states and years. The inclusion of these variables is the key to estimating differencein-differences models as described above. These state and year indicators control for
idiosyncratic, unobserved factors specific to each state and linear and nonlinear
trends in the outcomes of interest over time, respectively. Throughout the analysis, I
cluster the standard errors at the state and year levels to account for the possibility of
serial autocorrelation.227

225. McMichael, supra note 31.
226. See Frakes, supra note 99, at 262 n.11 (noting that his models focusing on obstetric
outcomes include similar control variables).
227. To address the possibility that obstetric outcomes are correlated within particular
states and years, I estimate standard errors clustered at the state and year levels. See Marianne
Bertrand, Esther Duflo & Sendhil Mullainathan, How Much Should We Trust Differences-InDifferences Estimates?, 119 Q.J. ECON. 249, 254 (2004) (noting that clustering can address
the problem of serial autocorrelation).
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D. Results and Discussion
Before delving into the different effects of SOP laws across different levels of
malpractice pressure, I first examine SOP laws in isolation to determine whether,
using my classification scheme, the estimated effects of these laws are consistent
with prior work.228 Figure 4 reports results for the effects of different SOP laws on
obstetric outcomes. Panel A reports the results from a series of regressions that focus
on the effect of allowing APRNs to practice independently, and Panel B provides
similar results focusing on the effect of allowing PAs to practice autonomously.229
Each point represents the effect of the relevant SOP law on the given obstetric
outcome,230 and the bars represent the 90% confidence intervals.231 Focusing on the
APRN SOP law results in Panel A, allowing APRNs to practice independently
results in a 0.8 percentage point increase in the probability of having a CNM attend
a birth. While this may seem like a small change, it represents an 11% increase
relative to states that do not allow APRNs to practice independently, implying that
relaxing SOP laws better allows APRNs to provide care to patients.

228. See Markowitz et al., supra note 10, at 209–16 (reporting the results of models that
used a different classification of SOP laws).
229. Each point represents a coefficient estimate derived from a separate regression model.
Individual models include an indicator variable for whether APRNs may practice
independently, a full set of control variables, and a full set of state and year fixed effects. Full
regression results are available in the Technical Appendix, supra note 31.
230. Because all of the regression models have an indicator as the dependent variable, each
coefficient may be interpreted as a percentage point change in the probability that the outcome
of interest occurs. To facilitate interpretation, Figure 2 reports the marginal effects (in terms
of percentage point changes) instead of the raw coefficient estimates.
231. When the bar representing the confidence interval does not intersect with the vertical
line indicating zero, the effect associated with that bar is statistically significant.
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Figure 4: Effect of Scope-of-Practice Laws on Labor and Delivery Procedures
Panel A: Effect of APRN Scope-of-Practice Laws

Panel B: Effect of PA Scope-of-Practice Laws

Note: Each point represents the coefficient on APRN independence (Panel A) or PA autonomy
(Panel B). Error bars represent the 90% confidence intervals and are calculated based on
standard errors clustered at the state and year levels. Each point is derived from a separate
regression model. The dependent variable in each model is an indicator for whether the birth
involved the outcome listed on the left. All regression models include a full set of control
variables and state and year fixed effects.
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As with the probability that a CNM attends a birth, APRN SOP laws have their
anticipated effect on the other labor and delivery outcomes. The probability a patient
receives a C-section decreases by 1 percentage point—a 3% decline relative to states
that restrict the practices of APRNs. C-sections on high- and low-risk patients decline
by 1.3 and 0.9 percentage points, respectively, and elective C-sections decrease by
0.8 percentage points. Similarly, allowing APRNs to practice independently reduces
inductions and elective inductions by 1.5 and 1.6 percentage points, respectively.
Consistent with the reduction in C-sections, the rate of VBACs increases slightly by
0.3 percentage points.232
As the results reported in Panel B indicate, 233 allowing PAs to practice with
autonomy has the anticipated effects on labor and delivery outcomes.234 PA
autonomy has approximately the same impact on C-sections and low-risk C-sections
as APRN independence. However, at a 2.8 percentage point reduction in high-risk
C-sections, PA autonomy has a larger impact than APRN independence. This larger
impact is consistent with PAs focusing on more medically complex patients than
APRNs. The effect of PA autonomy on inductions and elective inductions is less
than half the magnitude of the effect of APRN independence, and the effect on
elective inductions is not statistically significant. Again, these effects are consistent
with PAs focusing more on medically complex patients and APRNs having a broader
impact on less complex patients. Finally, PA autonomy slightly increases VBAC
rates, but not as much as APRN independence.
Overall, the results for APRN SOP laws are consistent with prior work,235 despite
the use of somewhat different classifications of these laws. And the results for PA
laws, while smaller in magnitude than those for APRN laws, demonstrate that
allowing PAs to practice with more autonomy can impact the delivery of healthcare.
Importantly, the results in Panel B represent the first empirical evidence of an effect
of PA SOP laws on the provision of obstetric care.
Extending the analysis to examine the joint effect of SOP laws and malpractice
liability, Figures 5–7 present the effect of SOP laws across different levels of
malpractice pressure. These figures summarize a series of regression results to
illustrate the joint impact of SOP laws and malpractice pressure on obstetric care. In
particular, each point in these figures represents the effect of the specified SOP law
in the specified malpractice quartile.236 In all figures, the baseline (for purposes of

232. A reduction in C-section rates has countervailing effects on VBAC rates. On one
hand, fewer C-sections means more vaginal births, which should increase VBAC rates. On the
other hand, fewer C-sections means that there are fewer patients who have previously had a
C-section and thus fewer patients who can vaginally deliver after a C-section. The estimates
reported here represent the combined effect of these two mechanisms.
233. Because PA SOP laws do not legally affect the practices of CNMs, the specification
with an indicator for whether PA autonomy impacts the probability that a CNM attends a birth
is omitted. In general, PA autonomy does not have a statistically significant effect on this
outcome.
234. Full regression results are available in the Technical Appendix, supra note 31.
235. See Markowitz et al., supra note 10, at 209–16 (reporting similar results).
236. Each point represents the effect of the given SOP law within the given malpractice
pressure quartile and is calculated from the individual coefficient estimates from a regression
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comparison) is the most restrictive SOP law in the first malpractice pressure quartile.
The bars connected to each point represent the 90% confidence intervals.237
Figure 5 reports the joint effect of APRN SOP laws and malpractice pressure on
the probability that a CNM attends a birth (Panel A) and the probability that the
patient undergoes a C-section (Panel B). At low levels of malpractice pressure,
allowing APRNs to practice independently has the anticipated effect—CNMattended births increase and C-sections decrease. However, these effects clearly
dissipate as malpractice pressure increases. The probability of undergoing a Csection in a state that allows APRNs to practice independently and has the highest
level of malpractice pressure is almost exactly the same as the probability of
undergoing a C-section in a state that restricts the practices of APRNs but has the
lowest level of malpractice pressure.238 Similarly, while the probability of having a
CNM attend a birth increases by 2 percentage points in states with the lowest levels
of malpractice pressure once APRNs can practice independently, CNMs are slightly
less likely to attend a birth in states that allow independent practice and have the
highest levels of malpractice pressure.

model that includes an indicator for APRN independence, indicators for different malpractice
pressure quartiles, and interactions between the APRN independence indicator and the
malpractice pressure quartile indicators. Full details of this calculation are provided in the
Technical Appendix, supra note 31.
237. When the bar representing the confidence interval does not intersect with the vertical
line indicating zero, the effect associated with that bar is statistically significant.
238. Of note is the fact that the restricted-practice and APRN-independence lines never
cross in Figure 5. Thus, while the probability of undergoing a C-section is approximately the
same in the highest malpractice pressure quartile in independence states and the lowest
malpractice pressure quartile in restricted-practice states, allowing APRNs to practice
independently always reduces C-section rates. Comparing independence states and restrictedpractice states in the highest malpractice pressure quartile (the two rightmost points)
demonstrates that the independence states have lower C-section rates.
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Figure 5: Effect of APRN Scope-of-Practice Laws on Delivery Outcomes
Panel A: CNMs

Panel B: C-Sections

Note: Each point represents the effect of the given SOP law within the given malpractice
pressure quartile. Each point is calculated from the individual coefficient estimates from a
regression model that includes a full set of control variables and state and year fixed effects.
Error bars represent the 90% confidence intervals, which are based on standard errors
clustered at the state and year levels.

Collectively, these CNM and C-section results demonstrate that the effect of SOP
laws is not constant across different levels of malpractice pressure. And, importantly,
these results are consistent with the threat of liability impacting the decisions made
by individual healthcare providers. They suggest that CNMs are less willing to attend
births after being granted independence in areas with high malpractice pressure.
Instead, CNMs continue to rely on physician supervision and the shifting of liability
(toward physicians) that this entails. As demonstrated by the relatively flat line (and
lack of statistical significance) for CNM-attended births in states that restrict APRN
practices, CNMs do not generally respond to malpractice pressure in states that
require physician supervision. However, they clearly respond—by attending fewer
births—to malpractice pressure in states where they can practice independently and
bear more responsibility for their own malpractice.
A similar pattern is present in the C-section results. While allowing APRNs to
practice independently results in a relatively large decrease in the probability of a Csection when malpractice pressure is low, it has essentially no effect when
malpractice pressure is high. At the same time, C-section rates remain relatively
stable across different levels of malpractice pressure in states that restrict APRN
practices. Thus, these results suggest that APRNs respond to malpractice pressure
when they can practice independently and therefore bear greater malpractice risk.
This is consistent with malpractice liability exerting a greater deterrent effect when
APRNs can practice independently.239

239. While these results demonstrate that malpractice pressure exerts greater deterrence
when APRNs can practice independently, that does not necessarily mean that it induces the
optimal level of C-sections. Rather, the results only imply that APRNs respond more strongly
to malpractice pressure when they can practice independently.
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The results in Figure 6 tell a similar story, with APRN independence having the
greatest effect on the use of C-sections in high-risk and low-risk pregnancies at the
lowest levels of malpractice pressure (Panels A and B). APRN independence also
has a larger negative effect on elective C-sections at low levels of malpractice
pressure and, interestingly, has a positive effect on elective C-section rates at the
highest levels of malpractice liability (Panel C). Since elective C-sections are, by
definition, not medically indicated and therefore most susceptible to the influence of
nonmedical factors, such as malpractice liability, the positive and statistically
significant effect of high malpractice pressure and APRN independence suggest that
APRNs respond to malpractice pressure more strongly when they face higher
malpractice liability risk for their own acts and omissions.
Figure 6: Effect of APRN Scope-of-Practice Laws on C-sections
Panel A: High Risk

Panel B: Low Risk

Panel C: Elective

Note: Each point represents the effect of the given SOP law within the given malpractice
pressure quartile. Each point is calculated from the individual coefficient estimates from a
regression model that includes a full set of control variables and state and year fixed effects.
Error bars represent the 90% confidence intervals, which are based on standard errors
clustered at the state and year levels.

In the interest of succinctness, the effects of APRN SOP laws across different
levels of malpractice pressure on inductions and VBACs are reported in Figure A1
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in the Technical Appendix.240 In general, the joint effect of APRN SOP laws and
malpractice pressure on these outcomes is not as clear as on C-sections. Figure A1
provides evidence that SOP laws alone affect these outcomes, but the lines for
restricted practice and independent practice generally follow similar patterns. Unlike
the C-section results, in which the two lines converged, the relatively parallel paths
in Figure A1 suggest that the effect of APRN independence does not vary
substantially across different levels of malpractice pressure. This lack of an effect,
however, provides some support for the conclusion that healthcare providers respond
to the threat of liability, as inductions and VBACs do not involve the same risk
calculations (in terms of liability) as C-sections.
With respect to PAs and the SOP laws that govern them, a similar pattern of
effects emerges. Figure 7 reports the joint effect of malpractice pressure and PA laws
on C-sections. As reported in Panel A, which focuses on all C-sections, allowing PAs
to practice autonomously generally lowers C-section rates. However, as with
allowing APRNs to practice independently, this negative effect dissipates as
malpractice pressure increases. This pattern of effects is most obvious in C-section
rates among low-risk pregnancies (reported in Panel C), though it is apparent in Csections generally (Panel A) and C-section rates among high-risk pregnancies (Panel
B) as well. However, the limited practice and autonomous practice lines in Panel D
of Figure 7 are nearly parallel, suggesting that the effect of allowing PAs to practice
autonomously on elective C-sections does not vary substantially across different
levels of malpractice pressure. Since elective C-sections would be particularly
sensitive to malpractice pressure, these results imply PA SOP laws do not interact as
strongly with malpractice pressure as APRN SOP laws. This, however, is not
surprising because physicians always bear some responsibility for the actions of PAs,
meaning the marginal effect of changing SOP laws across different levels of
malpractice pressure is smaller for PAs than APRNs.

240. Technical Appendix, supra note 31, at A10.

870

IN DIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 95:821

Figure 7: Effect of PA Scope-of-Practice Laws on C-sections
Panel A: C-sections

Panel C: Low Risk

Panel B: High Risk

Panel D: Elective

Note: Each point represents the effect of the given SOP law within the given malpractice
pressure quartile. Each point is calculated from the individual coefficient estimates from a
regression model that includes a full set of control variables and state and year fixed effects.
Error bars represent the 90% confidence intervals, which are based on standard errors
clustered at the state and year levels.

Again, in the interest of succinctness, Figure A2 in the Technical Appendix reports
the joint effect of PA SOP laws and malpractice pressure on inductions, elective
inductions, and VBACs.241 With respect to inductions and elective inductions, no
obvious pattern emerges—either one that supports a clear effect of SOP laws
individually, a clear effect of malpractice liability individually, or a clear joint effect.
This lack of a clear effect is consistent with PAs not playing substantial roles in
inductions. With respect to VBACs, there is a slight convergence in the limited
practice and autonomous practice lines, particularly in the fourth quartile of
malpractice pressure, but this convergence is relatively subtle compared to the other
procedures examined here.
Overall, the results demonstrate that SOP laws impact the delivery of healthcare
but that this impact is not constant across different levels of malpractice pressure.
Allowing APRNs and PAs to practice independently and autonomously generally

241. Id. at A11.
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lowers the probability with which an infant is delivered via C-section, but this decline
is most pronounced in areas with low malpractice pressure. As malpractice pressure
increases, this decline becomes less pronounced, and in some cases, even becomes
an increase. This change in effect is consistent with APRNs, PAs, physicians, and
other providers responding to the threat of malpractice liability. Attributing this
change in effect to liability is supported by the general lack of a difference in effect
of SOP laws across different levels of malpractice pressure on inductions. Relative
to C-sections (and VBACs), inductions are generally less risky in terms of
malpractice liability. Thus, the evidence that SOP laws have a relatively constant
effect on inductions across different levels of malpractice pressure suggests that the
different effects observed for C-sections stem from the threat of liability. Given these
effects, a relevant question is whether the observed differences in choice of
procedure attributable to SOP laws and malpractice pressure lead to different health
outcomes.
Results for the joint effect of SOP laws and malpractice pressure on health
outcomes are reported in the Technical Appendix.242 Focusing just on SOP laws, I
find that these laws either improve the health outcomes of both mothers and infants
or have no statistically significant effect, with APRN SOP laws generally having
stronger effects than PA SOP laws. This suggests that the results above indicating a
decrease in the intensity of treatment for millions of women do not imply that these
women or their infants suffer poorer health outcomes. Indeed, if anything, the
decrease in treatment intensity results in improved health outcomes for both mothers
and infants.243 Extending the analysis to examine the joint effect of SOP laws and
malpractice pressure, I find some evidence of a joint effect. However, this evidence
is generally weaker than that reported above, suggesting that, while the choice of
delivery method is highly sensitive to SOP laws and malpractice pressure, health
outcomes are less so.
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND A NEW APPROACH TO PATIENT SAFETY
Across multiple models focusing on different obstetric outcomes, I find strong
and consistent evidence that relaxing the SOP laws governing APRNs and PAs
affects obstetric outcomes and that this effect varies depending on the level of
malpractice pressure faced by providers. This differential effect across different
levels of malpractice pressure is consistent with the anticipated effects described
above. It also suggests that restrictive SOP laws increase the malpractice risk faced
by physicians and lower this risk for APRNs and PAs because, without this risk
shifting in the first instance, there is no reasonable way to explain the differential
effect of liberalizing SOP laws across different levels of malpractice pressure. This
Part explores the policy implications of these results.244 It first discusses how these

242. Id.
243. These results are consistent with the WHO’s conclusions that C-section rates above
10% do not generally improve population health outcomes and may actually result in poorer
outcomes. See Betrán et al., supra note 25.
244. One set of important implications not fully explored here is how gender affects the
results reported above in at least two specific ways. First, with respect to malpractice liability,
Jamie Abrams has argued that gender expectations distort tort law as applied to obstetric care
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results fit into the current understanding of licensing laws. Next, it explores how the
results, combined with prior evidence, suggest a new understanding of the role of
malpractice liability in the provision of healthcare. Finally, it uses the consistent
evidence of a joint effect of SOP laws and malpractice pressure to suggest a novel
way to resolve the ongoing debate over SOP laws by incorporating malpractice
liability and tort law into this debate.
A. The Role of Licensing Laws in the Provision of Healthcare
In general, the results of my empirical analysis add to a growing body of evidence
that allowing APRNs to practice independently generates important benefits for
patients. The results for APRN SOP laws are consistent with prior work and build
on the existing body of evidence in two important ways. First, while prior work has
narrowly focused on the laws governing CNMs,245 the analysis here examines the
laws governing APRNs more generally (including CNMs).246 Second, in examining
APRNs more broadly, the analysis here considers a different classification of APRN
SOP laws than that used by the Markowitz study and other prior work.247 This
classification scheme focuses more specifically on individual laws and can therefore
provide policymakers important information about which laws to amend if they wish
to achieve lower C-section rates and treatment intensity consistent with WHO
guidelines.
With respect to PA SOP laws, the results reported here are the first empirical
evidence concerning the effect of these laws on obstetric outcomes and some of the
first rigorous empirical evidence on PA SOP laws more generally. In general, PA
SOP laws have not received the same amount of attention in the academic literature
as have APRN SOP laws. This may stem from the facts that APRNs outnumber PAs,
classifications of PA SOP laws are less readily available, and PAs can never practice
independently (meaning the differences in PA SOP laws are subtler). Whatever the
reason, PAs can clearly impact the provision of healthcare and the evidence

because of its tendency to emphasize fetal harm over maternal harm. Jamie R. Abrams,
Distorted and Diminished Tort Claims for Women, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1955, 1995–97
(2013). Second, Nancy Lugo has argued that SOP laws also raise gender implications because
APRNs are more often women, though her argument is not specific to obstetric care. Nancy
Rudner Lugo, Full Practice Authority for Advanced Practice Registered Nurses Is a Gender
Issue, ONLINE J. ISSUES NURSING (May 2016), http://ojin.nursingworld.org/MainMenuCategor
ies/ANAMarketplace/ANAPeriodicals/OJIN/TableofContents/Vol-21-2016/No2-May-2016
/Articles-Previous-Topics/Full-Practice-Authority-for-APRN.html [https://perma.cc/M6QDRM5Z]. While exploring the gendered implications of the results is beyond the scope of this
Article, future work could fruitfully explore these important issues.
245. See, e.g., Markowitz et al., supra note 10, at 209–16; D. Mark Anderson, Ryan Brown,
Kerwin Kofi Charles & Daniel I. Rees, The Effect of Occupational Licensing on Consumer
Welfare: Early Midwifery Laws and Maternal Mortality 6–9 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 22456, 2016).
246. While CNMs certainly play a central role in the delivery of obstetric care, other types
of APRNs may directly and indirectly impact the provision of obstetric care (e.g., by providing
prenatal care that obviates the need for a more intensive intervention at the time of delivery).
247. Markowitz et al., supra note 10, at 203–04; see also, e.g., Kleiner et al., supra note
10, at 263–66.
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presented here begins to fill an important gap in the understanding of healthcare
workforce regulations and the effects of these regulations on healthcare outcomes.
The results for PA SOP laws suggest that, while amending these laws may not
lead to as large or as pervasive of an effect on obstetric care as amending those
governing APRNs, PA SOP laws can nonetheless impact the delivery of obstetric
care. The effects of PA laws are generally concentrated on individual procedure
choices—and less on outcomes affected by the availability of nonsurgical care—but
the size and statistical significance of these effects demonstrates that reducing the
restrictiveness of PA SOP laws should be considered alongside other strategies as a
viable option to impact the provision of healthcare.
B. A New Understanding of Malpractice Liability
In addition to providing new evidence on the role of SOP laws, the results
presented here offer new insight into the role malpractice liability plays in the
healthcare system, particularly its propensity to interact with other legal regimes.
Before delving into the implications of those interactions, however, it is worth noting
that the results elucidate an underappreciated aspect of malpractice liability in
healthcare. Specifically, the results reported here, when combined with existing
empirical evidence, suggest that the size of the payments providers must make to
resolve claims does not drive changes in their behavior. Rather, the prevalence and
allocation of these payments appear to play more salient roles in determining how
providers deliver care.
Much of the existing research on the role of tort liability in healthcare has focused
on tort reforms designed specifically to reduce the size of malpractice awards and
settlements. Caps on noneconomic damages have been at the center of many
studies.248 However, the evidence of the effectiveness of these caps, which focus
explicitly on the size of awards, is mixed.249 On the other hand, the evidence on the
effect of legal changes that reallocate liability consistently shows that this
reallocation impacts healthcare delivery. For example, Currie and MacLeod found
that joint and several liability reform, which results in a reallocation of liability
among physicians and hospitals, has a significant impact on obstetric care.250 Frakes
found that changing the standard of care (which determines whether a provider is
liable in the first place) similarly has a significant effect on obstetric care.251 The
results presented here demonstrate that changes to SOP laws, which can affect the
ability of patients to hold physicians liable and therefore affect the allocation of
liability between physicians, APRNs, and PAs, result in changes in the delivery of
obstetric care. Collectively, this evidence suggests that changes in how malpractice
liability is allocated or determined in the first instance may result in more substantial

248. See MELLO & KACHALIA, supra note 18, at 33–39 (reviewing many of these studies).
249. See id. at 36 (“A reasonable conclusion to draw from this group of studies is that
noneconomic damages caps have been shown to be associated with reductions in some, albeit
not all, indicators of defensive medicine. The evidence about effects on healthcare spending
is too varied to support a strong conclusion.”); see also Paik et al., supra note 112, at 85
(explaining that they find mixed evidence on the effect of noneconomic damages caps).
250. Currie & MacLeod, supra note 16, at 819–21.
251. Frakes, supra note 99, at 268–71.
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changes in the behavior of healthcare providers than reforms that affect the size of
damages awards. As policymakers continue to debate the contours of tort law and
malpractice liability, this evidence can inform the decisions that will determine the
functioning of tort law going forward.
Turning next to the more specific contribution of the empirical analysis, the
results demonstrate that providers respond to malpractice liability differently
depending on the SOP laws in place, as the effects of restrictive SOP laws vary across
different levels of malpractice pressure. This variation is consistent with SOP laws
shifting risk among providers, increasing the risk of liability for physicians, and
reducing it for APRNs and PAs. If restrictive SOP laws did not shift risk in this way,
then there would be no differential response to different levels of malpractice
pressure when SOP laws are relaxed. Instead, relaxing a particular SOP law would
generate the same change in the outcome of interest across all levels of malpractice
pressure. Thus, by demonstrating that relaxing SOP laws has different effects at
different levels of malpractice pressure, the analysis demonstrates that maintaining
restrictive SOP laws necessarily involves shifting liability risk from some providers
to others.
Far from simply illustrating an intriguing quirk of the legal and healthcare
systems, the evidence of liability shifting in the presence of restrictive SOP laws and
of a differential response to malpractice liability when SOP laws are relaxed has
important implications for the delivery of healthcare. First, the results demonstrate
that APRNs and PAs, like physicians, respond to the threat of liability by changing
how they provide care.252 CNMs attend fewer births when malpractice pressure is
high and when they face this pressure without the risk shifting of restrictive SOP
laws. Similarly, APRNs and PAs do less to reduce treatment intensity (as measured
by C-section and induction rates) when their liability risk increases. While this
evidence alone is probably not sufficient to conclude that APRNs and PAs practice
defensive medicine, it may be suggestive of that conclusion.253 And it is certainly
consistent with the conclusion that APRNs and PAs respond to the threat of
malpractice liability. In other words, the evidence demonstrates that tort law can
exert a deterrent effect on APRNs and PAs.
Second, the empirical evidence suggests that, by shifting liability risk among
providers, restrictive SOP laws add a layer of complication to the legal and
healthcare systems to the detriment of patients. Prior research has indicated that Csection rates in the United States are too high and that high levels of malpractice
liability risk can exacerbate this problem.254 By adding an additional layer of liability
considerations (such as whether a particular SOP law increases the chances that a
physician will be held vicariously liable or be subject to liability for negligent
supervision) on top of existing considerations (such as whether performing Csections reduces liability risk), restrictive SOP laws further complicate and obfuscate
the already complex incentives created by malpractice liability. This additional layer

252. For an analysis of tort law’s deterrent effect on physicians, see Black et al., supra note
17, at 109–12.
253. A full analysis of whether and to what extent APRNs and PAs practice defensive
medicine is beyond the scope of the analysis presented here. However, future work should
explore these questions.
254. Betrán et al., supra note 25, at 667; Boerma et al., supra note 154, at 1341.
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of complication may further exacerbate both the underlying problem of too many Csections and impede policymakers’ ability to address this problem by reforming the
laws governing malpractice liability.
For example, the evidence suggests that malpractice liability overdeters
physicians when states maintain restrictive SOP laws because, in addition to their
own liability risk, they bear direct and vicarious liability risks generated by APRNs
and PAs. Because physicians are primarily responsible for C-sections, the fact that
they are overdeterred by malpractice liability in the presence of restrictive SOP laws
may further exacerbate the problem of high C-section rates. While physicians are
overdeterred, malpractice liability commensurately underdeters APRNs and PAs
since some patients will choose to pursue claims against supervising physicians
instead of the APRNs and PAs who were directly involved in the underlying
malpractice incident. Thus, within the same malpractice regime, different providers
face markedly different incentives.
To the extent that policymakers wish to address inappropriately high C-section
rates by reforming the laws around malpractice liability, they will face uniquely
difficult challenges in doing so based on the different incentives created by
malpractice liability for different types of providers. Any policy that realigns the
malpractice risk for one group of providers necessarily misaligns it for another group
of providers. Unless lawmakers can formulate policies that differentially affect
physicians and APRNs/PAs in ways that precisely offset the difference in incentives
created by restrictive SOP laws, addressing the malpractice-risk aspect of C-section
rates will be next to impossible. While this insight and the empirical results that
support it may, at first glance, seem discouraging from the perspective of advancing
the debate over malpractice reform, they have encouraging implications for the
debate over SOP laws. Indeed, they offer a path to resolving this ongoing and heated
debate, and the next section follows this path in detail.
C. Liability as a Solution to the Scope-of-Practice Problem
In general, states justify SOP laws as necessary to encourage the provision of
high-quality care and ensure patient safety more generally.255 While these goals are
certainly important and SOP laws may serve to promote them, overly restrictive SOP
laws can be both “arbitrary”256 and “anticompetitive,”257 as the available evidence
does not suggest that restrictive laws are necessary to ensure (or even generally
promote) patient safety.258 Indeed, “[t]he rationale for restrictive . . . SOP [laws]
frequently invokes the differential training” completed by APRNs and PAs relative

255. GILMAN & KOSLOV, supra note 8, at 11 (“Together, licensure and scope of practice
regulations for APRNs and other health care professionals serve important consumer
protection objectives, including safety and quality.”).
256. Kleiner et al., supra note 10, at 264.
257. GILMAN & KOSLOV, supra note 8, at 15.
258. See GILMAN & KOSLOV, supra note 8, at 7–16, 38 (reviewing the available evidence
and concluding that restrictive SOP laws are not necessary to promote patient safety); see also
DUNKER ET AL., supra note 11, at 3–9 (reaching the same conclusion for PA SOP laws);
SCHIFF, supra note 11, at 4–10 (focusing on APRN SOP laws and reaching the same
conclusion).
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to that completed by physicians, as opposed to direct appeals to evidence suggesting
that granting APRNs and PAs more authority or autonomy will result in greater risks
to patient safety.259 Contrary to promoting patient safety, SOP laws often serve as
anticompetitive barriers that insulate physicians from APRN and PA competition in
markets for healthcare services.260 As such, these laws can reduce access to care,261
increase the price of care,262 and lead to inappropriate consumption of care.263
Based on the weight of the evidence demonstrating that restrictive SOP laws do
little to promote patient safety and generate identifiable harms typically associated
with anticompetitive restrictions, multiple groups have issued calls for states to relax
their restrictive laws.264 The National Academy of Medicine stated in 2011 that
“[n]urses [including APRNs] should practice to the full extent of their education and
training.”265 The National Governors Association issued a series of reports several
years later echoing this call for both APRNs and PAs.266 Following these calls, staff
at the Federal Trade Commission issued a report highlighting the anticompetitive
harms associated with restrictive SOP laws and urging states to reconsider these
restrictions.267
Some states have heeded these calls, but the majority still maintain restrictive
SOP laws, with less than half of all states allowing APRNs to practice independently
and no state allowing PAs to do so.268 Prior work has suggested that states may
maintain their restrictive laws for political reasons. For example, the National
Academy of Medicine explained that “what nurse practitioners are able to do once
they graduate varies widely for reasons that are related not to their ability, education
or training, or safety concerns, but to the political decisions of the state in which they
work.”269 Evaluating the role of political spending in state legislatures, McMichael

259. Barbara A. Mark & Esita Patel, Nurse Practitioner Scope of Practice: What Do We
Know and Where Do We Go?, 41 W.J. NURSING RES. 483, 484 (2019).
260. GILMAN & KOSLOV, supra note 8, at 15; see also ADAMS & MARKOWITZ, supra note
9, at 6 (“Currently, there are strong anticompetitive barriers to making more use of advanced
practice providers (APPs) in the health-care sector.”).
261. McMichael, supra note 4, at 759–64.
262. See Kleiner et al., supra note 10, at 276–77.
263. See Traczynski & Udalova, supra note 77, at 95–100; see also supra Part I (discussing
the harms associated with restrictive SOP laws).
264. One potential resolution to the debate over SOP laws that is attractive because it does
not require the active participation of state legislatures is the application of federal antitrust
law. The Supreme Court of the United States recently extended antitrust scrutiny to some
forms of occupational licensing laws, and this scrutiny could extend to certain SOP laws that
are based on state regulations. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101,
1110–16 (2015). However, the SOP laws that have the greatest effects on APRNs and PAs
(i.e., those governing physician supervision) are statutory and are thus not subject to antitrust
scrutiny. See id. at 1116–17; see also McMichael, supra note 13, at 298 (addressing the effect
of antitrust law on state SOP laws). Accordingly, the SOP law debate continues to occur in
the halls and chambers of state capitols.
265. INST. OF MED., supra note 11, at 4.
266. See DUNKER ET AL., supra note 11, at 9–10; SCHIFF, supra note 11, at 10–11.
267. See GILMAN & KOSLOV, supra note 8, at 38.
268. See supra Part I.
269. INST. OF MED., supra note 11, at 5.
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concluded that “increased political spending by physician interest groups decreases
the probability that states allow [APRNs] and PAs to practice with more autonomy .
. . .”270 While McMichael’s analysis included political spending through 2013, the
political battle over SOP laws has only become more intense since.271 Indeed, the
American Medical Association (AMA) adopted a resolution in 2017 committing
itself to “[e]ffectively oppose the continual, nationwide efforts to grant independent
practice . . . to non-physician practitioners [such as APRNs and PAs, among
others].”272 Other physician groups, such as the American Academy of Family
Physicians, have similarly dedicated themselves to opposing the relaxation of SOP
laws,273 which is not surprising given the clear pecuniary interest of physicians in
restricting the ability of other providers to compete with them in healthcare services
markets.274 Groups associated with APRNs and PAs have, unsurprisingly, resisted
these efforts by physician groups.275

270. McMichael, supra note 13, at 298.
271. Interestingly, the results presented here, when coupled with the results from previous
studies, suggest that physician groups may wish to mollify their stance against relaxing SOP
laws. While physician groups generally oppose expanding the authority of APRNs and PAs,
they also vigorously advocate in favor of reforms that will reduce physicians’ liability risk.
See, e.g., AMA, MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM NOW! 1 (2019) (outlining the AMA’s strong
support of tort reforms and other measures designed to decrease physicians’ liability risk).
Prior work has found that physicians’ liability risk increases when states maintain restrictive
SOP laws, and the empirical analysis here similarly reveals a pattern of effects consistent with
restrictive SOP laws shifting malpractice pressure away from APRNs and PAs and towards
physicians. See McMichael et al., supra note 15, at 321 (finding that the number of malpractice
claims paid by physicians can increase by as much as 31% when states maintain restrictive
SOP laws). Thus, opposing the relaxation of SOP laws necessarily places physician groups
directly at odds with reducing physicians’ liability exposure. To the extent that physician
groups wish to achieve their goal of reducing physician liability exposure, they should
consider moderating their stance on restrictive SOP laws.
272. AMA, supra note 14, at 238. See also id. (“Our AMA, in the public interest, opposes
enactment of legislation to authorize the independent practice of medicine by any individual
who has not completed the state’s requirements for licensure to engage in the practice of
medicine and surgery in all of its branches.”).
273. See, e.g., Letter from John Meigs, Jr., Bd. Chair, Am. Acad. of Family Physicians, to
Hon. Mark Mustio, Majority Chairman, Prof’l Licensure Comm., Pa. House of Reprentatives
& Hon. Harry Readshaw, Minority Chairman, Prof’l Licensure Comm., Pa. House of
Representatives (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.aafp.org/dam/AAFP/documents/advocacy/work
force/scope/LT-ProfessionalLicensure-OpposingPAAPRNScopeExpansion-101817.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZT9N-87EZ] (urging the Pennsylvania House of Representatives to reject
an expansion of APRN authority).
274. See Kleiner et al., supra note 10, at 261 (noting that, consistent with an erosion of
market power, allowing APRNs to practice independently reduces the wages of physicians).
275. See, e.g., Letter from Juliann G. Sebastian, Chair of the Bd. of Dirs., Am. Ass’n of
Colls. of Nursing & Deborah E. Trautman, President and Chief Exec. Officer, Am. Ass’n
Colls. of Nursing, to David O. Barbe, President, AMA & James L. Madara, Chief Exec.
Officer, AMA (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.aacnnursing.org/News-Information/News/View
/ArticleId/20827/Rounds-with-Leadership-11-29-17
[https://perma.cc/87F5-RPJZ]
(responding vigorously to the AMA’s announced opposition to relaxing the SOP laws
governing APRNs).
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While the conflict over restrictive SOP laws is certainly political, it is not partisan.
Both the Obama and Trump administrations issued reports noting concerns with SOP
laws, emphasizing the harms these laws inflict on patients, and calling for the
relaxation of the laws governing APRNs and PAs.276 Similarly, the left-leaning
Brookings Institution and right-leaning American Enterprise Institute have both
issued reports calling for the relaxation of SOP laws. 277 The libertarian-leaning Cato
Institute and Mercatus Center also support relaxing these laws.278
The bipartisan and widespread support for relaxing SOP laws invites the obvious
question of why states continue to maintain these restrictive laws. Political support
from the AMA and other physician organizations can certainly explain much of
states’ reluctance to reform these laws;279 however, states may also hesitate to relax
their SOP laws based on the nature of the reform proposals to date. While available
evidence suggests that states use the protection of patient safety as a pretext to
maintain restrictive SOP laws that serve as anticompetitive barriers to protect
physician market power, that evidence does not establish that states are wholly
unconcerned with patient safety.280 To the extent that legitimate concerns about
ensuring the provision of high-quality care and protecting patient safety enter states’
decisions to maintain restrictive SOP laws, existing proposals to relax these laws
may simply be insufficient.
In general, these proposals include straightforward recommendations that states
eliminate restrictive SOP laws without any suggestion as to alternative legal regimes
that may serve similar patient-safety goals as SOP laws.281 If state legislatures
maintain a high evidentiary bar when deciding whether to amend laws that protect
patient safety—an unsurprising and justifiable position given the paramount
importance of patient safety in healthcare—they may balk at the opportunity to adopt
previous proposals for relaxation because those proposals generally offer no

276. See U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. ET AL., supra note 12 at 31–36; U.S. DEP’T
TREASURY, supra note at 1213–14.
277. See ADAMS & MARKOWITZ, supra note 9, at 5–6 (urging the relaxation of APRN and
PA SOP laws in a report issued by the Hamilton Project which is an initiative within the
Brookings Institution); PETER BUERHAUS, AM. ENTER. INST., NURSE PRACTITIONERS: A
SOLUTION TO AMERICA’S PRIMARY CARE CRISIS 1–2 (2018) (urging the relaxation of APRN
SOP laws).
278. See Charles Hughes, These Scope of Practice Laws Don’t Improve Health Outcomes,
Serve Mainly as Barriers to Entry, CATO INST.: CATO AT LIBERTY (Nov. 2, 2016, 12:31 PM),
https://www.cato.org/blog/these-scope-practice-laws-dont-improve-health-outcomes-servemainly-barriers-entry [https://perma.cc/93WU-SVNZ] (noting the harms associated with
restrictive SOP laws); Scope-of-Practice Laws, MERCATUS CTR. (Mar. 22, 2017),
https://www.mercatus.org/scopeofpractice [https://perma.cc/YB93-DUKA] (emphasizing the
harms of restrictive SOP laws and arguing in favor of relaxation).
279. See McMichael, supra note 13, at 298.
280. ADAMS & MARKOWITZ, supra note 9, at 6; GILMAN & KOSLOV, supra note 8, at 1
(noting that state legislators are “rightly concerned with patient health and safety”).
281. See, e.g., ADAMS & MARKOWITZ, supra note 9, at 6 (“We argue that shifting spending
away from physician to [APRN and PA] services through a loosening of anticompetitive SOP
barriers is a viable and desirable policy route for the United States.”).
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alternative mechanism to promote patient safety.282 This Article fills that salient gap
in existing proposals by identifying a separate legal regime that can work to promote
patient safety.
Specifically, it offers tort law as an alternative mechanism to promote patient
safety, and two strands of empirical research support the use of tort law in this
context. First, prior research has demonstrated that malpractice liability deters the
provision of low-quality and unsafe care.283 For example, Iizuka concluded “that
higher liability pressure reduces preventable medical complications . . . .”284
Similarly, Frakes and Jena emphasized the deterrence role fulfilled by malpractice
liability, noting that “medical liability forces . . . hold the potential to elevate the
quality [of care].”285 Considering the significance of malpractice liability more
generally, Frakes noted that this liability “remain[s] a quite relevant influence on
physician practices in a more universal sense.”286 Finally, examining the specific
deterrence that malpractice claims exert—as opposed to malpractice pressure more
generally—two studies found evidence that individual physicians change how they
provide care after malpractice claims are filed against them.287
Second, the empirical evidence provided here demonstrates that tort law can
effectively deter APRNs and PAs just as it can physicians. As the results above
indicate, providers respond differently following the relaxation of SOP laws
depending on the malpractice pressure present in their state. While these different
responses provide important evidence of an interaction between SOP laws and
malpractice liability, they also offer evidence of the deterrent effect of malpractice
liability on the provision of obstetric care. For example, when malpractice pressure
is high, providers may perform more C-sections.288 Relaxing APRN and PA SOP
laws reduces C-sections significantly more when malpractice pressure is low,
demonstrating that APRNs and PAs respond to malpractice pressure as physicians
do. Given this clear and predictable response to malpractice pressure following the
relaxation of SOP laws, states can be confident that eliminating restrictive laws will
not result in a vacuum in which providers can freely deliver substandard and unsafe
care. Instead, once exposed to liability risk traceable to their own actions, APRNs
and PAs will respond to the deterrence exerted by malpractice liability.
Moreover, the analysis and evidence provided here suggests that, by eliminating
the complications imposed on the functioning of malpractice liability by restrictive
SOP laws, states may better enable tort law to exert deterrence on individual
providers. As discussed above, restrictive laws shift liability from APRNs and PAs
to physicians.289 Accordingly, tort law overdeters the latter and underdeters the

282. See Mark & Patel, supra note 259, at 485 (“Another possibility is that state legislators
do not have enough evidence to inform legislative priorities.”).
283. This prior evidence is entirely consistent with the empirical results reported here
which indicate that providers (of all types) change how they deliver care in response to
malpractice pressure. See supra Part III.
284. Iizuka, supra note 17, at 164.
285. Frakes & Jena, supra note 18, at 144.
286. Frakes, supra note 217, at 385.
287. See Dranove & Watanabe, supra note 93, at 85–91; Shurtz, supra note 91, at 339–40.
288. Yang et al., supra note 22, at 239.
289. See supra Section IV.B.
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former.290 By relaxing SOP laws, thereby eliminating this liability shifting, states can
allow malpractice liability to deter physicians, APRNs, and PAs directly. Facing
liability risk commensurate with their own actions and only their own actions,
providers of all types can respond directly to the incentives to provide safe care
created by tort law. Thus, not only does tort law provide an alternative mechanism
to accomplish patient-safety goals, it functions better in achieving these goals once
restrictive SOP laws—and the complications they impose—are removed.
I do not mean to suggest, however, that tort law or medical malpractice liability
as currently conceived and practiced represents an ideal approach. Legal, medical,
and economic scholars—myself included—have articulated specific criticisms of the
current tort system,291 and the results presented above suggest that malpractice
pressure may encourage the overuse of C-sections (i.e., overdeter providers). By
offering tort law as an alternative mechanism to accomplish patient-safety goals, I
am not arguing that policymakers and scholars should abandon attempts to address
the shortcomings of medical malpractice liability.292 Instead, I argue only that tort
law, despite its shortcomings, can effectively deter healthcare providers and that this
deterrence (imperfect as it may be) can accomplish the patient-safety goals that
currently support maintaining restrictive SOP laws.
Importantly, tort law can achieve these goals without imposing the substantial and
pervasive harms that prior work has shown accompany restrictive SOP laws. Indeed,
the results presented above demonstrate that the increase in the intensity of care
attributable to malpractice pressure is only a fraction of the increase attributable to
SOP laws. Tort law can also better ensure patient safety once restrictive SOP laws,
and the liability shifting they facilitate, are eliminated. Finally, it is worth noting that,
with restrictive SOP laws eliminated, efforts to reform tort law to better calibrate the
deterrence it exerts can move forward without needing to address the complicated
liability shifting induced by restrictive SOP laws.
CONCLUSION
Examining all births in the United States between 1998 and 2015, I find consistent
evidence that allowing APRNs and PAs to practice with more autonomy reduces the
use of medically intensive procedures. Extending the analysis, I also find evidence
that the effect of relaxing SOP laws differs depending on the malpractice pressure
faced by providers. This evidence is consistent both with liability shifting among
providers when restrictive SOP laws are in place and with tort law exerting a stronger
deterrent effect on APRNs and PAs when they can practice with more autonomy.

290. Id.
291. See, e.g., Avraham & Schanzenbach, supra note 16, at 278–84 (finding evidence that
defensive medicine results in the inefficient provision of care); Frakes, supra note 217, at 378–
85 (noting new avenues for reform to address current problems in the medical malpractice
system); McMichael et al., supra note 144, at 393–94 (arguing that apology laws are a new
generation of tort reform that exacerbate the problems they are designed to solve); Mello et
al., supra note 113 (exploring opportunities for tort reform at the federal level).
292. Indeed, the evidence presented here, while not specific to defensive medicine, suggests
that providers may be overdeterred by the current malpractice system and may practice
defensively.
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These results have important implications for the current understanding of how
both SOP laws and malpractice liability impact the provision of healthcare.
Additionally, the empirical evidence presented here suggests a possible resolution to
the increasingly heated debate over SOP laws. States maintain these laws on the basis
of protecting patient safety. To the extent this justification is not a pretext to protect
physicians from competition in healthcare services markets, the results here suggest
that eliminating restrictive SOP laws will not undermine patient safety. With these
laws abrogated, tort law can better deter individual providers—physicians, APRNs,
and PAs, alike—and thereby discourage the delivery of unsafe care. Indeed, the
evidence and analysis presented here suggests that eliminating restrictive SOP laws
may better promote patient safety. Doing so would eliminate the complicated ways
in which these laws interact with malpractice liability and thereby inhibit the ability
of tort law to deter individual providers. Overall, the empirical evidence presented
in this Article favors relaxing restrictive SOP laws and suggests that doing so will
improve healthcare delivery, access to care, and patient safety.

